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EDITORIAL

Evangelistic Preaching 63

ARTICLES

Christian Theology and the Bible — Eugene R. Fairweather — 65

Some Negative Thinking on the Question of Peter's Roman Residence and Martyrdom — G. Gerald Harrop — 76

Demythologisation and Dogmatics — John McIntyre — 85

Soviet Materialistic Philosophy Versus American Practical Materialism — W. O. Fennell — 92

The Roman Catholic Church and the State in Canada — Kenneth H. Cousland — 101

Historical and Biblical Theology: A Reply to Alan Richardson — James C. S. Wernham — 107

BOOK REVIEWS

Friedrich Gogarten: *Demythologizing and History* — George Johnston — 111

R. C. Chalmers: *The Protestant Spirit* — Allan L. Farris — 113

Edmund Cahn: *The Moral Decision* — C. Douglas Jay — 115

Emile Cailliet: *The Dawn of Personality* — James S. Thomson — 117

William Hordern: *A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology* — W. O. Fennell — 119

William Graham Cole: *Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis* — James R. Guthrie — 121

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Editorial

EVANGELISTIC PREACHING

THE following lines open a little known biography of an evangelist who spent a forty-year ministry in Prince Edward Island in the last century:

> Early one morning in the autumn of 1827, a man wearing a shabby Clan-McDonald-tartan cloak and a tall 'beaver hat' stood by the Malpeque Road a few miles north of Charlottetown. A thin column of smoke arose from a heap of manuscript before him. It was the Reverend Donald McDonald, Minister of the Church of Scotland, on the morning of his conversion burning his old sermons. [*The Rev. Donald McDonald. Glimpses of his Life and Times.* M. Lamont. Charlottetown, 1902.]

We question whether all converted ministers should destroy their whole sermon "barrel," but we fully understand why Donald McDonald took such impetuous action on that eventful day. A new revelation of the grace and wisdom and power of God in Jesus Christ has an immediate effect on the witness of the one who receives that revelation. In the case of a clergyman this experience may indeed lead to the conviction that his former preaching has been "foolishness" in the most literal sense, and that he must make a completely new start in proclaiming the Word of God. Further experience will often correct this impression. The preacher, if he has been at all faithful, and truly called, must believe that he has all along been making the Gospel known, but now, with his new insight, he will also rightly feel the need of transposing his proclamation to a higher key. As he himself has tested the swordlike sharpness of the Word, and learned its power, so he will resolve to use it more aggressively for the salvation of souls.

This thought has relevance to the current revival of interest in evangelism. It is probably true that Canadian churchgoers of today hear better moral exhortation from the pulpit than ever before. But it cannot be denied that they, and particularly the unchurched, need to hear more mission preaching, more evangelizing, more proclamation of the Gospel in its ancient simplicity and potency. This renewed emphasis must inevitably lead to heart searching in the parson's study, and to revision, if not destruction, of sermons "written aforetime."

The primitive Christian *Kerygma*, following Jesus' own preaching of the Kingdom of God, led up to a forthright challenge to the hearer, either as a definite command, "Repent," or in the form of a solemn proclamation that faith in the Lord Jesus Christ could alone give salvation. This final call, which, when responded to, led many into the fellowship of the Church, is less frequently and earnestly sounded in modern preaching. Commenting on this point Bryan Green writes in *The Practice of Evangelism*:

> It is here that many a good Gospel sermon fails to be thoroughly evangelistic. The preacher concludes with some pious platitude or kindly hope that

everyone present will realize his responsibility to give an answer to Christ. Often one hears closing words like this: "So let us all now. . . ." The bite and challenge of the message are completely ruined.

In his remarkable little book *The Great Divorce* C. S. Lewis pictures the spirits of the departed being presented with the choice between "Heaven" and "Hell." They had presumably refused to make that choice in the days of their earthly pilgrimage, but now they can no longer postpone a final decision. The author uses all his skill as a narrator—and at times he rivals William Law and John Bunyan in his ability to depict character—to tell how human beings will argue in their own defence and refuse to humble their pride, even though nothing less than their eternal destiny is at stake. The book is fanciful of course, but it is packed with illustrations of that truth which often finds better embodiment "in a tale" than in a sermon, and which, just because of its storylike presentation, can more easily "enter in at lowly doors." It is a truth which the preacher of the evangel must realize intensely if he is to present it with telling force. The homely words of George Macdonald provide the text on which *The Great Divorce* is but a commentary:

> No, there is no escape. There is no heaven with a little of hell in it—no plan to retain this or that of the devil in our hearts or our pockets. Out Satan must go, every hair and feather.

Effective evangelistic preaching must confront the hearer with the need of ultimate choice. Modern prophetic voices must, like Elijah, point out the folly of halting between two opinions. Such a fearless setting forth of the Christian Good News will demand both humility and courage from him who speaks and him who listens. Part of the preacher's humility may consist in a willingness to learn how to prepare and deliver more frequently the kind of sermon which may be used by the Holy Spirit to bring sinners to repentance. Thus to cause "joy in heaven" should be the aim of Gospel preaching in this year of grace.

Christian Theology and the Bible*

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

I. The Question of Biblical Theology

CAN theology be biblical? If so, in what sense? At first glance, at least, these questions may seem singularly foolish. After all, one does not need to be unusually observant to be aware of a wide variety of treatises on "biblical theology," emanating from a number of Christian communions, and it is tempting to close debate on the first question by drawing attention to the principle: *Ab esse ad posse valet consequentia.* As for the second question, many will answer, not only that the Bible must be the point of departure for all theological thinking, but also that we risk the distortion of Christianity by "Hellenization" or the "ontological deviation" or the "philosophical norm," if we abandon the "biblical perspective," the "Hebraic conception of the living God," the "biblical understanding of man," and formulate our theology in terms derived from an extra-biblical metaphysic. Confronted by this massive onslaught, the theologian of scholastic tendencies may well be tempted to borrow an attitude from St. Jerome and say, *Peccavi, peripateticus sum, non christianus,* and then take refuge in the "biblical point of view."

And yet, I am sure that this temptation can be and must be resisted. To begin with, the consensus from which we have just inferred the possibility of "biblical theology" is more apparent than real. It is certain that all its exponents do not use the term in the same sense, and I hope to make it clear that some of the most eager defenders of what they call "biblical theology" are talking about something quite impossible. This impossible enterprise, I should add, is precisely that retreat to the "biblical outlook" which marks a good deal of contemporary Protestant theology and which is ultimately an illegitimate, even if tempting, abdication of theological responsibility. While Christian theology cannot live without biblical roots, to say this is not to assert that theology must be biblical in any exclusive sense.

Before we set out the problem more fully, it may be useful to note that the contemporary emphasis on biblical theology raises certain perennial questions with renewed force. Of course, if "biblical theology" simply meant a survey of the religious ideas of the biblical writers (as it does in many instances), these problems would not arise. For the writers I have in mind, however, "biblical theology" really means "theology"—not just an account of beliefs once held in a particular religious tradition, but a com-

*Presidential Address to the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies, Toronto, May 20th, 1955.

prehensive exposition of authentic and universally valid revelation. It is to certain debatable presuppositions of this kind of theology that I wish to point.

(*a*) For example, the very phrase "biblical theology" assumes the unity of the biblical message, however subtly that unity may be defined in order to do justice to the wide conceptual diversity which marks the biblical formulations of religious truth. This assumption, however, brings before us the ancient question of the "spirit" and the "letter." Whether we seek, with the Fathers, to find countless prefigurations of the Christian Gospel in the Old Testament, or endeavour, with many modern theologians, to locate the unity of Scripture in the sense of the *Heilsgeschichte* which it records, we are making essentially the same attempt to interpret the biblical literature as a whole in the light of a principle derived from Christian faith.

(*b*) But secondly, the assumption that the biblical text by itself will suffice to remove the veil from our minds, so that we can readily discover the "spirit" within the "letter," has no immediately evident biblical basis. On the contrary, it is made within the context of the Christian tradition, and as soon as it is formulated it raises very sharply the problem of "Scripture and Tradition."

(*c*) Finally, the exclusive emphasis on "biblical" categories revives an attitude to which, on the whole, Christian theology has never been favourably disposed—namely, hostility to the natural reason. Even if we find Father Brown's explanation to Flambeau of his penetration of the latter's clerical disguise—"You attacked reason. It's bad theology."[1]—a trifle oversimplified, the principle he enunciated has presided over the theological enterprise for a good many centuries. Indeed, the greater part of Christendom would suppose that the problem had long ago been resolved in a "liberal" sense, at the latest when the *homoousion* made its appearance in the Creed, despite protests against its "unscriptural" character. I should certainly be prepared to argue that, when *theologia* emerged in the twelfth century as a unified technical discipline, over against a practical identification of theological work with the exposition of the *sacra pagina*,[2] and the ground was thus prepared for the subsequent developments of theological science, all this was simply the implementing of a decision rightly made by the Church centuries before—dare I say, at the moment when the Fourth Gospel was recognized as canonical?

These three questions should be kept in mind as we consider, first the virtues and then the defects of "biblical theology," and try to formulate a conclusion. While it would be unfair to lump all the exponents of a theological biblicism together and to suggest that all of them would subscribe to the most extreme propositions of any one of them, these basic

1. Cf. "The Blue Cross," in G. K. Chesterton's *The Innocence of Father Brown*.
2. To avoid misunderstanding, we should note that the term *sacra pagina* did not refer to Scripture in isolation from Tradition.

problems arise in connexion with the very enterprise of biblical theology, and one may justifiably speak of biblical theology as an entity because of the extent to which a common answer is offered for them.

II. The Case for a Biblical Theology

The "biblical theology" movement derives a good deal of its force from certain considerations which every Christian theologian must respect. Thus, if we are to be critical of some fundamental elements of biblical theology, we must at the same time recognize its legitimate concerns, and I propose to comment on three of these, related to our three primary problems.

(*a*) In the first place, biblical theologians have been impressed by the necessity of rescuing the Bible, as an authentically theological text, from the widespread tendency to treat it exclusively as a manual of Near Eastern history or a source-book for the comparative study of religions—a tendency from which even theological schools have not been wholly free! Believing as they do in the unique significance of the Church's message as divine revelation, these writers have sought to recover the awareness of the unique significance of the book in which the Church sees the primary expression of her message. I shall suggest that biblical theology is sometimes excessively naive in its treatment of the duality of Scripture as human writing embodying divine revelation. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the theological treatment of Scripture is essential to the very life of Christian theology, and that in practice every school of biblical exegesis which has had any responsible relation to the Church has paid tribute to this necessity. Even though the Church must admit that the biblical writings, because of their human character, are a legitimate subject of historical investigation, she cannot be satisfied with the historical approach alone, since her age-long attitude towards the Bible has been one of expectation of spiritual food for the believing soul. "Whatever was written in former days was written for our instruction, that by steadfastness and by the encouragement of the scriptures we might have hope."[3]

(*b*) A second noteworthy feature of biblical theology is its "ecumenical" concern. Biblical theologians persuasively urge that a return *ad fontes* will enable us to bypass a good deal of militant and unenlightened confessionalism. This consideration deserves to be taken seriously in a fragmented Christendom, where uninformed confessional loyalties have too often produced an arid traditionalism, less satisfactory, if only because less broadly based, than the tradition against which the compilers of the Reformation confessions rebelled. I shall suggest that biblical ecumenicists are often too optimistic about the ease with which the plain sense of Scripture can be discovered, and that this optimism stems from a failure to take the power of tradition seriously enough, or to ask what light authentic tradition may

3. Rom. 15:4. (Biblical quotations follow the RSV.)

shed on the Bible itself. Nevertheless, they are right in reminding us that, since ecclesiastical tradition and the theology of the schools are *ex hypothesi* a development of the revelation made once for all, the theological and spiritual health of the Christian mind can only be safeguarded by constant recourse to the events and words uniquely witnessed to by Scripture. On this issue, their essential concern is simply to recall St. Paul's warning: "Even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel contrary to that which we preached to you, let him be accursed."[4]

(*c*) A third feature of biblical theology is its concern to avoid the corruption of theology by an alien metaphysic or anthropology. Biblical theologians have stressed the danger of distorting the faith by expressing it in philosophical categories derived from a radically different world-view, or even of turning faith into philosophy—perhaps piously described as "philosophy of religion," but still philosophy! Again, this warning demands the attention of every theologian who is aware that the function of the Church is not to discover a philosophy but to proclaim a Gospel. I shall argue that biblical theologians often deal with the problem of philosophy much too simply, and that the theological house, the moment one lone philosophical demon has been evicted, is ready for occupancy by seven still more demonic demons. Nevertheless, enough has happened in Christian history to provide some moral justification for an anti-philosophical reaction in the direction of biblicism. Leaving aside the Gnostic extravagances of those who, from Valentinus and Basilides to Kant and Hegel, have more or less deliberately incorporated Christian terms and symbols into essentially non-Christian syntheses, one can note a number of important philosophical aberrations within the main stream of Christian thought. We might, for instance, point to the Origenist doctrine of creation, man and sin, with the difficulties it raises for the Christian understanding of time and history; to the tendency, visible in St. Augustine, and more dangerously exemplified in certain Christian mystics of Neo-Platonic temper, to interpret the human soul in Platonic terms, with the consequent difficulty in distinguishing the soul from the divine; to the widespread minimizing of the historical and the sacramental in the interests of a false spirituality; to the reduction of the Gospel of the Kingdom to a simple imperative of social amelioration; or to the transmuting of Christian eschatology, with its emphasis on the divine grace and power in resurrection and judgment, into a progressivist optimism about human history or the destiny of the soul. In the face of all this, one can hardly blame theologians for being impressed by another Pauline warning: "See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the universe, and not according to Christ."[5]

All these considerations may well seem to constitute a strong case for the

4. Gal. 1:8.

5. Col. 2:8.

working-out of Christian theology on rigidly biblical lines. The biblical theologian is clearly aware of the theological function of the Scriptures, of the normative and corrective use of the Scriptures, and of the ever-present danger of the infiltration of Christianity by elements essentially incompatible with its fundamental truths. And yet, I cannot see that such a drastic solution of our problems is necessary or desirable. Let us turn, then, to some reflections on the limitations of the biblical approach to theology.

III. A Critique of Biblical Theology

As I suggested at the beginning, the assumptions of a biblicist theology raise certain venerable problems, which must be confronted, sooner or later, not only by the student of the history of Christian thought, but also by anyone who is not prepared to undertake biblical study in a vacuum. These problems may conveniently be dealt with in strict parallelism with the threefold defence of the aims of biblical theology, just advanced.

(*a*) The theological reaction against "biblical archaeology" has its peculiar dangers, which form perhaps the most serious fault in the whole structure. At times, it may be hard not to sympathize with the reaction, particularly if we have just consulted, say, a volume of the Old Testament section of the *International Critical Commentary*, with a view to the immediate exposition of the Christian faith in the pulpit or the dogmatic theology classroom! Yet theological impatience can lead to a distortion of historical evidence by unproved assumptions or hasty generalizations—a procedure which is unbiblical, contrary to the implications of the Gospel of the Incarnation, and intellectually dishonest. For Christian thought, necessarily rooted in the Incarnation, the Augustinian formula, *per hominem Iesum ad deum Christum*, must serve as the guiding principle in the approach to Scripture. That will mean that the knowledge of the "letter" is the only path to the knowledge of the "spirit." As Richard of St. Victor put it very moderately, in one of the most important biblical commentaries of the Middle Ages: "The structure of the spiritual understanding is more firmly established, when it is duly based on the solid foundation of the historical sense."[6] If it is true that the clarity of the New Testament *imago* dissipates the obscurity of the Old Testament *umbra*—I refer, of course, to St. Ambrose's famous triad: *umbra*, *imago*, *veritas*[7]—it is also true that we apprehend the *imago* in an historical life, and that in consequence our understanding of it depends on our knowledge of that life in its historical setting. In other words, if the Christian is to see, with the Fathers, a spiritual "prefiguration" of the New Testament in the Old, he must in some sense have lived through the historical "preparation" for the New Testament in the Old, and must live by the historical realities of the New. There is a

6. *In visionem Ezechielis*, prologue (*PL*, 196, 527).
7. *In Ps.* 38, 25 (*PL*, 14, 1101); cf. Heb. 10:1.

very subtle danger of Gnosticism in any theological shortcut which evades the implications of the fact that "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh."[8]

(*b*) We should note, moreover, that the "spirit" which some biblical theologians find in the "letter" is a very subjective spirit indeed, because of their self-imposed limitations with respect to Tradition. The suggestion that we can somehow abstract "biblical" from "dogmatic" theology is at once one of the most plausible and the most misleading features of many pronouncements on biblical theology. It is true that a theological interpretation of some aspect of Scripture does not mysteriously acquire validity merely by being held by a number of people for a long time. There is, however, a traditional pattern in terms of which Christians have interpreted the Old Testament history, and in the context of which the New Testament literature emerged, and we cannot assume that we can ignore this pattern and still grasp the Christian meaning of the biblical text, even if we study the latter intensively and at length. The biblical text arose out of a history which produced certain other things as well—notably the remaining structural elements of the Church's *paradosis*, and the ongoing life of the Church thus constituted. We should note, in the first instance, the significance for our approach to Scripture of the fundamental structure itself. The Creed, rooted in the primitive *kerygma* and the baptismal confession made in response to the *kerygma*, isolates those moments of the history which constitute a key to the rest and indicates their meaning for Christian faith. The Sacraments, as efficacious signs of grace, establish the vital relation of the Christian with the climactic events of the passion and resurrection of Christ, and thus enable him to live spiritually in the biblical history. The historic Ministry of the Church, by its very continuity of commission, both witnesses to the relation of the Church to the primary events and helps to guarantee that to which it bears witness. As for the continuous life of the Church, based on this structure, it includes at the very least the corporate effort of the Christian mind to understand the biblical revelation in the setting, not simply of painstakingly reconstructed history—though the task of reconstruction cannot be evaded—but also of the living community to which the Word of God first came, and apart from which its full significance cannot be appropriated. In other words, there is something essentially contradictory in the attempt to see through the "letter" to the "spirit" outside the "fellowship of the Holy Spirit." "No prophecy of scripture is a matter of one's own interpretation, because no prophecy ever came by the impulse of man, but men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God."[9]

(*c*) I have already suggested that an exclusively biblical approach to theology can lead to the domination of Christian thought by unacknowledged (and indeed unrecognized) philosophy. It should be added that this tendency is not least dangerous when the metaphysic adopted is that

8. I John 4:2. 9. II Peter 1:20f.

assumed (at least in germ) by biblical writers themselves. Indeed, this "fundamentalism" in relation to philosophy is more threatening than fundamentalism, old style, if only because its exponents may not quite realize what they are doing. Let me indicate two or three of the forms which this philosophical irresponsibility takes.

(i) A good illustration is provided by G. Ernest Wright, *God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital.*[10] Here, along with much of outstanding value, we have (1) a dubious and one-sided emphasis on the activist, historical, non-conceptual aspects of the biblical outlook (particularly in the Old Testament), to the practical exclusion of contemplative and theological elements, and (2) an implicitly nominalistic critique of "propositional dogmatics",[11] which is at least partly responsible for this emphasis. In other words, we are faced here with an unexpressed philosophical viewpoint which takes advantage of the philosophical naivety of the Old Testament writers to identify itself with the theology of the Bible. Needless to say, we must recognize the centrality in Christianity of the divine action and of faith as response to the Word spoken in redemptive action, and we must not minimize the "existential" character of the biblical message, as addressed to the whole man in the totality of his thought and action. If this necessary acknowledgement is extended, however, to the point where we ignore the vision of God as the goal of faith or forget that faith is *inter alia* an earnest of the heavenly vision, such an extension can only be the effect of the influence of an extra-biblical metaphysic. To be more explicit, what we see in the exaggerated (and sometimes divergent) emphases on "myth" or "event" or "recital" is the end-product of the medieval nominalism, and concomitant anti-intellectualism, which so deeply influenced Luther's critique of the older scholasticism.

(ii) We can find another illustration of the problem in Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time.*[12] Here, while the same anti-metaphysical metaphysic may well be operative, the more conspicuous feature is a philosophical obscurantism which deliberately appeals to the biblical outlook as determinative (though perhaps without realizing all the implications of this appeal). There is, it is true, a sense in which the fundamental Christian doctrines of God, of his free creation of the world and man, of man's sin and God's redemptive acts, must necessarily affect the Christian approach to philosophical problems. The consequences of this principle in the history of Christian thought have been brilliantly presented, with a refreshing freedom from biblical literalism, by Etienne Gilson.[13] This does not, however, seem to be Cullmann's point. As contrasted with the attempt to rethink philosophy in the light of the central truths of the Christian faith, Cullmann's simpler aim appears to be the reduction of philosophy to a "biblical"

10. London, S.C.M. Press, 1952.
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 109.
12. Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1950.
13. Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, Scribners, 1936).

metaphysic in a more naive sense—namely, the metaphysic, such as it was, and assuming that there was only one, implicit in the thought of the Old Testament writers, and incorporated thence into the New Testament. It is undeniable that the Greek mind, both outside and inside the Church, has not infrequently drawn, from its typical philosophy of the eternal, unacceptable conclusions respecting the divine activity in history. I think, however, that it is also undeniable that the Hebrew mind was too metaphysically innocent even to be able to make this mistake, and that this immaturity, even though it left full scope for pictorial representations of the divine action, was not in itself a superlative virtue! May it not be that the Christian mind can produce—or even has produced—a metaphysical synthesis that does justice both to the divine eternity and to the divine action, and that it is not necessarily either tied to Hebraism or taken in by Hellenism? I am not arguing that the biblical exegete should not attempt to report the philosophical ideas of his authors, just as he gives an account of their scientific conceptions and of anything else that will help us to understand what they were saying. What I do ask is that he should not simply line up texts, with or without help from an unexamined philosophy, and then present the result as decisive for Christian theology. This subtler fundamentalism is just as shoddy intellectually as fundamentalism in connexion with the biblical cosmogony or the historical difficulties of the biblical narrative.

(iii) The same criticism applies to my third illustration. When the Christian doctrine of human nature and destiny is discussed, the biblicists have a field day. Again and again, the incompatibility of the "Hebraic" concept of man as an "animated body" with the "Greek" concept of man as an "incarnate soul" is stressed, often with a good deal of oversimplification, both historical and theoretical, and we are given to suppose that loyalty to the Christian revelation somehow requires philosophical "Hebraism." Those who take this line, however, do not reflect on the possible inadequacies of the Hebrew anthropology, any more than they consider the radical change of perspective necessitated by the Christian understanding of man's transcendent destiny and worked out in St. Paul's transformation of crude "Hebraic" ideas of resurrection. Once again, a particular philosophical prejudice contributes to a biblical fundamentalism which, here as always, fails even to take into account the whole biblical message itself.

If the Christian theologian is to fulfil his responsibility in the Church and the world, he must avoid all these tempting shortcuts and face the more strenuous, but ultimately more fruitful, task of trying to deepen his understanding of the Christian faith by the instrumentality of his knowledge of the world in which he professes that faith. If we want a biblical charter for this enterprise of Christian philosophizing in complete freedom from bondage to the "letter," I suggest that we shall find it in St.

Paul: "Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made."[14]

IV. The Theological Use of Scripture

It is time to draw some tentative conclusions as a guide to the theologian in his use of the Bible. These conclusions are explicitly addressed to the theologian; it may well be, however, that incidentally they will help to assure the historical scholar, the churchman and the philosopher that it is possible to take the theological use of Scripture seriously without doing violence to their legitimate concerns. At least, I hope to make it plain that "theology" cannot be identified with an extremist "biblical theology."

(*a*) In approaching the problems of the historical criticism of Scripture, the theologian will not try to theologize before the fullness of the time is come. As a theologian, with a professional awareness of philosophical problems, he may find it his duty to warn the biblical scholar against allowing unconscious metaphysical presuppositions to affect his assessment of historical evidence, but it is not his business to tell the historian what evidence is there. The history whose meaning he intends to expound, as a central element of his theological work, must be real history, history as it happened. To try to impose premature patterns on the story is to risk losing contact with God's self-manifestation in history, rather than to safeguard it. The theologian does have certain criteria for his assessment of the history and his discrimination of the abiding from the transitory within it, and these criteria are not derived simply from historical exegesis of Scripture. Nonetheless, he is interested in assessing and discriminating only within the area of the historically given.

(*b*) In the second place, when the theologian attempts to unfold the full inner meaning of the history, one of the conditions of his undertaking is that he should live within the continuation of that history, that is, within the continuous life of the Christian community. If it is contrary to the Christian understanding of history to try to dictate to the historian, it is equally contrary to that understanding to contract out of the living fellowship which emerged from the biblical history and to which the historical revelation was entrusted. It is hard to see how the theologian can understand God's dealings with Israel in Christian terms apart from the Christian Creed, which so simply defines the meaning of the whole story. It is hard to see how he can understand the sacrificial system and the "sacraments" of the Old Covenant, to say nothing of the adumbrations of the idea of vicarious sacrifice in the "Servant Songs," in terms other than those of *Religionsgeschichte*, unless he not only knows of Christ's atonement in conceptual terms, but also lives with the Sacraments of redemption—the baptismal death and resurrection with Christ and the eucharistic *anamnesis*

14. Rom. 1:20.

of his passion and resurrection. It is hard to see how he can understand either the priestly people and the priesthood of the Old Testament or the application of sacerdotal ideas to the atoning work of Christ in the New Testament, unless he knows something of the priestly life of worship and oblation which the Church offers to God. In other words, it is hard to see how he can possibly appropriate the revelation of God proclaimed in Scripture as long as he tries to get at the theological meaning of the biblical history, as distinguished from the human details of that history, in isolation from the extra-biblical elements of Tradition. The theologian, then, must be *homo ecclesiae*, if he is not to distort the revelation which he undertakes to expound.

(*c*) In the third place, there is no authentic theology when there is no attempt to correlate the truths of creation and redemption with the actualities of the world that God has created and redeemed. Of course, when the theologian begins to make such an attempt, he may know something of what he can expect to find, because the very nature of the world and its relation to God imply that faith and reason overlap at certain crucial points—for example, in the awareness of the world's dependence on its divine Creator, or in the recognition that man is the kind of being who is capable of responding to the promises and the demands of the Word of God. But if he is to be an effective theologian—or, more important, an honest theologian—he must not be satisfied until he sees these truths about the world and its inhabitants, no longer mediately through the eyes of faith, but immediately in the world to which the Word of faith is addressed. This means that the theologian must be a live philosopher, who does not cling to the "biblical" metaphysic any more than to the "biblical" astronomy, but rather tries to see how the genuine philosophical implications of biblical religion are realized in the actual world, in order to understand the Gospel in its full intelligibility. *This* kind of "demythologizing" is necessary and right; what we have to avoid in our philosophizing is not the correction of the world-view of the biblical writers, but the confusion of such correction with the repudiation of truths which are not part of an exploded conception of the world and man but, on the contrary, are essential elements of the Christian faith.

Perhaps this discussion has not taken us very far. It has dealt in much too general terms with the relation between historical investigation and theological insight. It has raised the spectre of tradition and emphasized the importance of extra-biblical elements in the Christian tradition, without discussing either the historical validation of the claims made for such elements or the nature of the extension of tradition in the contemporary Church. It has stressed the necessity of genuine philosophical reflection without giving more than the simplest indication of the directions in which such reflection should move. Nonetheless, it has at least indicated the fundamental questions which the theologian must face if he is to make

adequate use of the Bible without falling into the blunders of a too narrowly biblical theology.

In the light of all this, what can "biblical theology" mean for the Christian theologian? Certainly not the impossible dream of an exclusively "biblical" interpretation of Christian faith, by which some minds are haunted, but rather a comprehensive study of biblical history and thought, undertaken from the standpoint of Christian faith and with genuine awareness of the other intellectual responsibilities of the Christian thinker. In this sense, biblical theology is a condition of the healthy functioning of the Christian intelligence, which otherwise is in danger of getting lost in the biblical history, of losing direct contact with the primary record of God's revelation, and of substituting philosophical speculation for evangelical proclamation. And yet, if "biblical theology" bypasses history, rejects tradition, or repudiates philosophy, it is arguable that the remedy is worse than the disease which it purports to cure. Obviously, then, one urgent task of contemporary theology is to discriminate wisely between the exaggerated claims of certain theologians, which it must repudiate, and the insights which it must accept as permanent acquisitions of Christian thought.

Some Negative Thinking on the Question of Peter's Roman Residence and Martyrdom

G. GERALD HARROP

THE recent Vatican excavations and Dr. Oscar Cullmann's biographical study[1] have recently revived the question of Peter's residence and martyrdom in Rome. That the most recent disposition among scholars is to accept as probably true the traditional position is attested, not only by Cullmann's book, but by two recent commentaries in English on I Peter. E. G. Selwyn, who argues for the authenticity of the epistle states: "The association of St. Peter with the church of Rome for some time at least before his death is too well attested in tradition to allow of our doubting it."[2] F. W. Beare, though he rejects the traditional ascription of authorship, sees no reason to doubt the historicity of the account of the martyrdom of Peter and Paul by Nero, in Rome, in 64 A.D.[3] Professor George Johnston is also to be numbered among the believers here.[4]

Despite this formidable weight of scholarly opinion for the tradition, and the contemporary mood of conservative acceptance of "tradition" generally, it is to be the contention here that the balance of probability still lies with the opinion that Peter died in Palestine. That we can get only balance of probability, and not proof, is freely admitted by Cullmann[5] to whose intriguing and exhaustive study of the problem we now turn.

Cullmann cites three types of sources available to us for the study of this problem: literary, liturgical and archaeological.[6] He puts little or no reliance on the so-called liturgical texts; none of those cited by him antedate the third century, and he concedes that "taken by themselves" they "yield little help in solving our problem".[7] Indeed these sources reveal a twofold and contradictory tradition, both the Vatican Hill and the catacombs being connected with the memory of Peter's burial place.[8] This difficulty Lietzmann attempted to obviate by supposing that the apostle's bones were moved from their original grave to the Appian way.[9] The so-called liturgical texts reveal no more than the fact that by the third century the tradition of the Roman martyrdom and burial of Peter was firmly established, especially in Rome. This no one could deny.

It was in his Christmas message of 1950 that Pope Pius XII announced

1. Cullmann, *Peter: Disciple-Apostle-Martyr*, trans. F. V. Filson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953).
2. E. G. Selwyn, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (London: The Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1947), p. 61.
3. F. W. Beare, *The First Epistle of Peter* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947), pp. 10–11.
4. G. Johnston, review of Cullmann's *Peter* in *Canadian Journal of Theology*, I (April, 1955), p. 54.
5. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 114, etc.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 77, f.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

that "the grave of the Prince of the Apostles has been found." The Pope conceded that the mortal remains of Peter had not been identified. With admirable clarity Cullmann summarizes the evidence that led the Pope to make his claim:

> Presumably, however—though not at all with certainty—we may assert . . . that the "trophy" of Gaius appears to have been found. If this is true, it is the single positive result of the excavations as far as they concern Peter; the result is thus a confirmation of the literary testimony of Gaius, which, however, takes us back only to the end of the second century.[10]

Gaius was a Roman presbyter who lived about the turn of the century. The passage of interest to us here is one in which Gaius is countering the claim of the Montanist Proculus that the church in Hierapolis has the graves of Philip and his daughters. To make a much greater claim for Rome, Gaius is quoted by Eusebius as follows:

> But I can show you the trophies (*trophaia*) of the apostles, for if you go to the Vatican Hill or to the highway to Ostia, you will find the trophies of those who have founded this church.[11]

Cullmann conceded that Gaius' claim that the two apostles founded the church at Rome is inaccurate.[12] Moreover, it is Eusebius, not Gaius, who names the apostles. Furthermore, it is not clear whether a *trophaion* is a grave or a victory memorial, although Eusebius himself, it would seem, understood the word in the sense of "grave."

In a largely pagan cemetery, underneath the Church of St. Peter, part of a monument has been found which may be the "trophy" referred to by Gaius. That in the vicinity some bones have also been found confirms our suspicion that cemeteries may well contain bones! We have also to contend with an ancient tradition that associates Peter with Paul in burial on the Appian Way.[13] To account for this conflict some defenders of the tradition assert one or more transfers of the apostolic relics between the two places.[14] That the grave of Peter was located in the Vatican area at all is doubted by Cullmann because, (*a*) it is unlikely that Christians would have buried Peter in the vicinity of Nero's garden, and (*b*) the apocalyptic expectations of this time militated against a cult of relics in the late first century.[15] Interest in relics, states Cullmann, can be first seen about the time of Gaius himself.[16] "The archaeological investigations do not permit us to answer in either a negative or an affirmative way the questions as to the stay of Peter in Rome. The grave of Peter cannot be identified."[17] This is Cullmann's own estimate of the value of the archaeological evidence.

Father Roger T. O'Callaghan, in a recent issue of *The Biblical Archaeologist* gives his interpretation of the results of the recent excavations. He is,

10. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 117, 118, quoting Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, III, 31, 4.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 149.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

as we should expect, somewhat more enthusiastic than Cullmann about what they have to offer. Father O'Callaghan cites Cullmann's willingness to concede the finding of the trophy of Gaius and he states that Cullmann's book was published "before the news of the inscription in the Valerii mausoleum".[18] This inscription is, it seems, a portrait of "two heads, one above the other."[19] The lower of these heads is "traced in red lead and partly redone in charcoal. It is of an old man, completely bald, with a deeply furrowed brow and large eyes."[20] But the inscription is dated about 270–290 A.D.[21]

All in all, the excavations seem to confirm what was already well known —that a cult of apostolic relics in this area goes back into the third century, perhaps back as far as 160 A.D., if that be the date of the monument referred to by Gaius. Archaeology has not made any less decisive the witness and the silences of the first and early second century witnesses. It is to these that we must now turn.

John 21, a supplement to the gospel notoriously difficult to accredit and date, contains, as it stands, a reference to Peter's martyrdom in verse 19a, which is a commentary on the enigmatic words attributed to Jesus in verse 18:

> 18. "I tell you, when you were young, you used to gird yourself and go where you pleased, but when you grow old, you will stretch out your hands and someone else will gird you and take you where you do not wish to go."
> 19. He said this to show the kind of death by which Peter was to honor God. (Goodspeed's translation.)

The direct speech in verse 18, separated from the narrator's comment in verse 19a, could refer merely to the helplessness of old age, or to imprisonment. But it seems more natural to keep the words of Jesus and the comment on them together, and to understand that the writer of John 21 referred to the martyrdom of Peter, almost certainly after its occurrence. Cullmann's comment, following Leitzmann, that "it was hardly customary to hand down accounts of martyrdom with no indication of place"[22] seems strange here. For this appears to be precisely what the author of John 21 did in fact do! Nowhere in the words in which Jesus commissions Peter to feed his sheep is there any suggestion of Peter's removal to a remote place. And this is in a passage that almost certainly postdated Peter's death, however and wherever it occurred. All that John 21 tells us is that at the time of its writing the tradition of a martyred Peter had been formed in the Church. There may also be an allusion to martyrdom in the body of the gospel, at 13:36–38.

Leaving aside as mere conjecture the identification of the two prophets of Revelation 11 as Peter and Paul,[23] we turn to what, it would seem, is

18. R. T. O'Callaghan, "Vatican Excavations and the Tomb of Peter", *The Biblical Archaeologist*, XVI (1953), p. 86.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
22. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.

the most important New Testament witness for the theory of a Roman sojourn for Peter—the reference to "Babylon" in I Peter 5:13. It does indeed seem more likely that Babylon is a cryptogram for Rome rather than a reference to a place of that name in Mesopotamia or Egypt.[24] If the writer of this epistle is indeed Peter or Silvanus, as Selwyn thinks, this reference must be counted heavily in favour of the historicity of the tradition of a Roman residence—more so than the much-debated, but quite ambiguous, I Clement 5:4. Even if the proper personal and place names are part of the device of pseudepigraphy, as Beare believes, and the date of the epistle is about 115 A.D., you do have a tradition connecting Peter and Rome early in the second century. But still, it must be noted, about fifty years after Peter died, if he died in the reign of Nero.

The reference in II Peter 2:14 is of no help at all, being merely the words of an old man anticipating his own death. In fact its lack of reference to martyrdom and locality rather counts against the Roman residence tradition as the undoubted late date of II Peter would perhaps make one expect an allusion to martyrdom in Rome. Whether historical or not, the tradition of Roman residence must have been established close to the date of the composition of this pseudepigraphon.

In the New Testament, then, we have allusions to, probably reminiscences of, Peter's martyrdom in John 13:36 and 21:18, 19a. But the only passage which may place Peter in Rome toward the end of his life is I Peter 5:13. If we accept Professor Beare's date of about 115 for I Peter,[25] we have the earliest reference associating Peter with Rome written about half a century after his alleged martyrdom there, unless we except I Clement 5:4 to which we must now turn, after noting once more that there is no single New Testament reference to a Roman martyrdom. As it is the place, not the fact, of martyrdom, that is under debate, I Peter 5:13 is certainly the crucial New Testament passage. It seems surprising that the defenders of the tradition pay comparatively little attention to it.

Professor Cullmann regards I Clement as "the decisive literary witness" and states: "If a relatively great probability is anywhere attainable for one view or the other, it must be in the fifth chapter of this writing."[26] Before we examine this passage, we might point out that the almost certain date of 96 A.D. for I Clement is still thirty years after Nero. This would give plenty of time for a form of tradition about a martyred Peter to take upon itself a local aspect not present in the earlier accounts. But it is to be the contention here that it is by no means certain that we have in the fifth and sixth chapters of this writing a reference to a Roman martyrdom at all.

The relevant texts are in a more extended passage in which Clement is discussing the evil results of jealousy. He refers to the histories of the following victims of jealousy: Abel, Esau, Joseph, Moses, Aaron and Miriam,

24. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
25. Beare, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–19.
26. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

Dathan and Abiram and David.[27] Then comes the decisive passage for our purpose which we will set forth in full in Goodspeed's translation:

V. But to pass from ancient examples, let us come to those who have most recently proved champions; let us take up the noble examples of our own generation. (2) Because of jealousy and envy the greatest and most upright pillars of the church were persecuted and competed unto death. (3) Let us bring before our eyes the good apostles!—(4) Peter, who because of unrighteous jealousy endured not one or two, but numerous trials, and so bore a martyr's witness and went to the glorious place that he deserved. (5) Because of jealousy and strife Paul pointed the way to the reward of endurance; (6) seven times he was imprisoned, he was exiled, he was stoned, he was a preacher in both east and west, and won great renown for his faith, teaching uprightness to the whole world, and reaching the farthest limit of the west, (7) and bearing a martyr's witness he passed out of the world and was taken up into the holy place, having proved a very great example of endurance.

VI. With these men who have lived holy lives has been gathered a great multitude of God's chosen, who have set a splendid example among us in enduring many humiliations and tortures on account of jealousy. (2) On account of jealousy women have been persecuted and made to endure dreadful and unholy insults, as Danaids and Dirces, and reached the sure goal in the race of faith and won the true prize, weak in body though they were. (3) Jealousy has estranged wives from their husbands, and nullified the words of our forefather Adam, "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." (4) Jealousy and strife have overthrown great cities and uprooted great nations.

VII. We write this, dear friends, not only to warn you, but also to remind ourselves, for we are in the same arena, and the same contest is before us.

Concerning this passage, Cullmann says: "This is thus the only passage that speaks explicitly of the death of Peter, and it should be said at the outset that we do not learn much from it. We must therefore see whether and how far it is permitted to derive more from the context."[28]

Two clues to a possible local reference in I Clement 5:4 are: (1) The fact that Peter and Paul are cited as victims of jealousy—presumably jealousy among Christians. We learn from Philippians 1:15–17 that this situation did exist in the place of Paul's imprisonment which was, in all probabilty, but not certainty, Rome.[29] (2) By associating Peter and Paul with "the great multitude of God's chosen who have set a splendid example among us" (*en hēmin*), identifying the "great multitude" as the Neronian martyrs and interpreting *en hēmin* locally, we get a Roman reference here.[30]

Against the first of these two considerations, it could be argued that we are by no means sure of the Roman origin of Philippians. But even if we should concede this the fact remains that Clement's readers in Corinth, if they retained any memories of Paul's letters, would have the best reason in the world to know that Rome had no monopoly on jealousy or contentiousness among Christians.

27. I Clement 4:1–13.
28. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

Cullmann's statement: "Only concerning the Roman church do we know that jealousy reigned in it,"[31] is extraordinary, especially in view of the fact that Clement's letter or sermon is to Corinth. Two words used by Clement, *zēlos* and *eris*, with a definite local reference appear together in both Corinthian letters (I Cor. 3:3; II Cor. 13:20). In view of these texts, and the whole story of Paul's difficulty with the Corinthians because of contending factions,[32] it is difficult to account for the following statement of Cullmann: "Clement is characterizing the vice which is causing such devastating results in the previously so exemplary church of Corinth that he is addressing."[33]

Against Cullmann's second reason for reading in a Roman reference here, can be put the possibility that there is no necessary geographical and temporal connection between Peter and Paul and the "great multitude of God's chosen." It is quite possible, perhaps likely, that in chapter six as in chapter five we have merely a list of seven incidents of jealousy and its dire results, listed chronologically.

Moreover, it is an undoubted fact that the phrase *en hēmin* carries no necessary spatial and geographical connotation, as Cullmann seems to think.[34] In the two very familiar passages, Luke 1:2 and John 1:14 it refers, in the first instance, to the whole Christian community (almost certainly), and in the second, most probably, to all mankind. There may be a geographical reference in Acts 2:29, but not in a narrow, specific sense. In I Corinthians 3:18 *en hēmin* refers to the society rather than its place of existence as it does in the familiar Synoptic reference to the kingdom of God being *en-humin*.[35] It would seem that the normal Christian usage of this phrase did not carry spatial limitation at all. If, as Cullmann testifies, the balance of probability will be decided by the Clementine reference, it does not appear to the present writer that this tips the scales at all decisively for the legend. The ambiguity of the passage is seen in the fact that for C. C. Torrey it is a witness against the tradition of a Roman residence:

> We can only wonder, for example, how Bacon, *The Gospel of Mark*, p. 284, could find the doctrine of Peter's martyrdom at Rome "seemingly present in Clement *ad. Cor.* v. 4 and vi. 1"(!); for, so far from any such "seeming", the idea is excluded by the passage. Clement knows that Peter gave the supreme witness somewhere, and he says this much, in very general terms. . . . But in the next-following sentences, as he comes to speak of Paul, his enthusiasm mounts and he is much more definite. Paul, he says, preached the gospel "both in the east *and also in the west*," and in the latter region suffered martyrdom "in the presence of the rulers." It is perfectly evident that Clement had no knowledge of a sojourn of Peter in Rome, or of his alleged martyrdom there, and the fact is decisive. This means, unquestionably, that the Roman church

31. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
32. I Cor. 1:10, f.; 3:3, f. etc.
33. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Cullmann seems to contradict this statement on p. 103 where he refers to Clement's reminder in chapter 47 of the earlier partisan divisions in Corinth.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 97. "But the fact that. . . . Clement uses the words 'among us' proves that he is concerned to give in the second group examples that are particularly close to him in place." See also p. 105.
35. Luke 17:21.

of the first century knew nothing of any labors of the great apostle in their city.[36]

Somewhere along the line of tradition that transformed an illiterate Galilean fisherman[37] into the founder of the church at Rome, the writer of encyclical letters in learned Greek, and the Prince of the Apostles, the first of the Popes, history breaks off and hagiographic legend takes over. Dr. Cullmann, as we have seen, and perhaps the majority of contemporary Protestant scholars take as historical the tradition that Peter went to Rome, but reject the claim that he founded the church there. The break comes somewhere. Our argument is simply that it is reasonable, and inherently probable, to assume that it comes before the alleged journey to Rome or the New Testament writings that post-date that journey would almost certainly have contained some reference to it.

The silence of the Epistle to the Romans makes it almost certain that Peter was not in Rome by the date of that writing. Beare believes that he was not there when Paul arrived in 62 A.D. and that the location of Peter's late missionary activity was the area mentioned in the salutation to I Peter.[38] He supports the historicity of the Roman residence tradition because of the "absence of any rival tradition."[39] This absence could be accounted for by the fact, if it be a fact, that Peter died a natural and unheroic death in Palestine. The New Testament references to martyrdom indicate, however, that Peter did indeed die the martyr's death—and we see no reason to dispute this. For what purpose did Peter, whose sphere of responsibility was to "the circumcision"[40] make the hazardous journey to Rome when he was almost certainly an old man? Surely it is easier to account for this story in later decades, when the churches were contending for supremacy among themselves on the basis of the possession of apostolic relics, than to make this unnecessary and, as we contend, unsupported assumption. Peter, unlike Paul, was not a Roman citizen. No business would take him there. His language was not Hellenistic Greek, certainly not the rather elaborate idiom of I Peter, but Aramaic with a definite provincial accent.

It seems to be a characteristic of our time that we have a disposition to glorify hagiographa with the wonderful word "tradition" and assume that any tale is better than none—that in the absence of a contemporary record we must accept later "traditions," however aetiologically explicable these may be, as a more reliable clue than inherent, historical probability. Thus, in the "absence of any rival tradition"—it would seem—we must accept as historical the dogma of the physical ascension of the Blessed Virgin!

But is there no alternative to the received tradition in this case? Two

36. C. C. Torrey, *Documents of the Primitive Church* (New York: Harper Bros., 1941), p. 10.
37. Acts 4:13. *agrammatos* meaning "without letters".
38. F. W. Beare, "Acts 9–15 and Peter's Career", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXII (1943), p. 302.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
40. Gal. 2:7.

writers, D. F. Robinson[41] and W. M. Smaltz,[42] have argued that we may indeed have a cryptic reference to Peter's death in Jerusalem in 44 A.D. in Acts 12:1–19.

This story as it stands, of course, does not say that Peter died, but it does say that he "went into another place" (*eporeuthē eis heteron topon*)[43] and it is possible to argue that this expression is a euphemism, and a characteristically Lucan euphemism, for dying. Thus Peter's deliverance from prison and appearance to a company of believers at the home of Mary, the mother of John Mark, is a kind of resurrection appearance. Robinson acknowledges the embarrassment that Peter's role in the conference described in Acts 15 creates for his view, but he points out the difficulties recognized by all in integrating Acts 15 into the chronological framework demanded by the autobiographical section of Galatians, the apparent contradiction between Galatians 2:7–9 and Acts 15:7 and the subordinate role of Peter in Acts 15. His conclusion is that Acts 15 has no historical value, being a late creation of the Jerusalem church to counteract its original mistake of opposing the Gentile mission.[44] The name "Cephas" in Galatians 2:9 would seem to indicate that Peter was alive about 52 A.D. but, as Robinson points out, the word appears in a different place in the several manuscripts and may well be an interpolation.[45]

W. M. Smaltz accepts Robinson's view that Acts 12:1–19 "represents an idealized account of the apostle's demise while suffering imprisonment under Herod Agrippa I."[46] He proceeds to support this thesis by a careful examination of the phrase *eporeuthē eis heteron topon* in Acts 12:17. That the word "go" was in the Biblical languages, as in modern English, sometimes an euphemism for dying is seen in the translation of *halakh* by *poreuesthai* in the LXX at Psalms 39:14 and Genesis 15:2. In the New Testament a good example appears at Luke 22:22, and here we have evidence of Lucan predilection for the expression as the Marcan (14:21) and Matthean (26:24) parallels have another word, *hupagein*.[47] A Lucan reference to Peter's prophecy of his own death (22:33) has the same verb (*poreuesthai eis thanaton*) where Mark (14:31) and Matthew (26:35) have the straightforward (*sun*)*apothanein*.

Smaltz conjectures that the "Peter" of Acts 15:2 is in fact a confused reference for the "Symeon" of Acts 13:1.[48]

But the most telling of Smaltz's arguments is the similarity between

41. D. F. Robinson, "Where and When did Peter Die?", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXIV (1945), p. 255, f.
42. W. M. Smaltz, "Did Peter Die in Jerusalem?", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXI (1952), p. 211, f.
43. Acts 12:17.
44. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
45. *Textus receptus* here, listing the names "James and Cephas and John" is supported by B and Aleph. A has only "James and John". p. 46 has "James and Peter and John". D and G have "Peter and James and John"—all in the order given. The argument here is that the word "Cephas" is not securely embedded in the text.
46. Smaltz, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

eporeuthē eis heteron topon in Luke 12:17 and *eporeuthē eis ton opheilomenon topon tēs doxēs* in I Clement 5:4. The present writer finds it difficult to resist the conclusion of Smaltz that "seen side by side in the Greek, it is difficult not to think that Clement had the Lucan passage in mind when he wrote."[49] Added to this is the fact that Clement, when he comes to speak of Paul's death writes *kai eis ton hagion topon eporeuthē*.[50]

It is conceded, with Cullmann, that we cannot have proof, one way or another, as to the location of the site of Peter's last days. What we are concerned to contest here is the assumption that, in the absence of contending traditions, a late but received tradition is better than none. This is more especially so when the growth of that tradition can be explained—in this case by the contest for supremacy among the churches and the importance of the possession of apostolic relics in that contest. The "Gaius" passage in Eusebius explains the reason for the growth of the tradition rather than attests to its historicity.

It may be that Acts 12:1–19 throws some light on the mystery of Peter's death. The arguments of Robinson and Smaltz, while not completely convincing, are, to say the least, plausible and worthy of study. But even if we must reject their thesis, the strange silences and ambiguous references in the early literature leave open the strong possibility that the great apostle died among his own people to whose evangelism his life had been dedicated.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
50. I Clement 5:7.

Demythologisation and Dogmatics

JOHN McINTYRE

THERE is grave danger that the demythologisation controversy may have run its course before the fundamental issues raised by it for dogmatic theology have been followed through to what might be regarded as a satisfactory conclusion. I draw attention to this danger in complete awareness of the facts that the controversy began with the discussion of the relation of myth to the *kerygma*, and that the discussion has fairly consistently observed the limits thus defined. As R. H. Fuller says in *Kerygma and Myth*, p. ix, ". . . as this is a matter of the interpretation of the New Testament documents, the solution must come from the exegesis of the New Testament. We must hearken to the testimony of the New Testament itself." Curiously enough, Fuller says earlier in the same paragraph, "the systematic theologian must be interested in the controversy if he is to take account of modern philosophy." However, as the controversy has developed, certain matters of fundamental internal importance for theology, and not simply of oblique importance through theology's interest in "modern philosophy," have emerged; and it is the purpose of this paper to elicit these and to indicate the relevance of the controversy to them.

Now, while the English-speaking world has not entered the controversy with the abandon shown by the Germans and the Swiss, probably because the war years cut us off from theological developments inside Germany, so that we were rather late in coming into it, nevertheless, we have already become aware of many of the implications of the controversy for the proclamation of the *kerygma*. It is realised that, for example, the communication of the Gospel is not merely a question of efficient techniques, but is also, and more pertinently, one of content; and we must be sure that in our proclamation we are summoning men and women to decision in regard to the Gospel, and not to some peripheral unessential. Nor are we as sure as we once were that even our own contemporary culture is necessarily an unequivocal medium for the illustration of the Church's message. These facts we have observed, and acted on accordingly—though the success of Billy Graham's London campaign has made the more cautious ask whether "modern man" is not more mythologically-minded than Bultmann appreciates.

The challenge of the controversy, it might be said, then, has been sharply accepted not only by the exegetes who have an obligatory interest in it, but also by those who seek a relevant proclamation. My fear is that the total implications of the challenge may be missed, because these two groups are held to exhaust the field of interest; whereas, in fact, the controversy could lead us to points at which our most serious dogmatic thinking today ought

to be taking place. *Kerygma und Mythos* ought to have as its sequel *Theologie und Mythos.*

In a certain sense it is true that demythologisation is one of the perennial functions of theology, its earliest clear expression being the Creeds, and its classical expression the Thomistic theology. If we give this alignment to the process of demythologisation, then two characteristic parts of the process may be observed, and these ought to be included in any adequate definition of the process. On the one hand, there is a large-scale elimination of the episodic as well as of the mythological in most if not all of the forms so clearly delineated by Professor Ian Henderson, (*Myth in the New Testament*, p. 46); and on the other hand, there is a thorough-going attempt to state the essential content of the Christian Faith in terms of contemporary culture. (The word "culture" is here used in its most comprehensive sense to include philosophy, psychology, socio-economic and political principles, cosmology and, one might add, superstitions.) Before proceeding to define what are, in my judgment, some of the basic dogmatic issues raised by the controversy, I should like to mention four assumptions made in demythologisation as thus analysed. (1) It is assumed that the original *kerygma* and, in fact, the whole of the Bible, is an amalgam of essential content plus mythological expression; that is, that they come to us in the terms of a past culture. (2) A further assumption is that the essential content is capable of separation from the mythological and episodic form, so that the demythologiser is subsequently able to express the essential content in terms of his later culture. (3) The demythologiser believes that his contemporaries, either can not understand the *kerygma* when it is proclaimed in the Biblical forms because of the difference in culture between them and the original situations; or, if they do understand the forms, do not "see the point of the situations" in relation to themselves, their sins and their needs. The narration of the *kerygma* in the Biblical forms does not call forth the appropriate responses either of acceptance or rejection. (4) This separation of the essential content from the unessential form in which it is expressed in successive generations implies that the demythologiser has some criterion of theological truth which enables him to make the all-important distinction between the essential and the unessential. Discussion of these assumptions, used at times by all parties to the controversy, should take us to the basic theological question of our time.

I. The Criterion of Theological Truth

We begin with the question of the criterion of theological truth, which appears to be the point at which contemporary theology is most divided and confused. The Roman Catholic Church with its firm standard of Scripture and Tradition, the Scholastic Calvinists with what B. B. Warfield called the Old Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, the extremist who interprets the "*testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti*" in completely subjectivist

fashion—these may know what the *regula fidei* is in its minutest detail. But with Protestant dogmatics at large the case is otherwise. Even Karl Barth, who in Volume I/i of *Kirchliche Dogmatik* in his Doctrine of the Word of God seemed to promise a working *regula*, has not gone on to do so in the later volumes of his work. He has not, to use his own words in Volume I/i, given us the means whereby we may invariably distinguish "what must be said under all circumstances" from "what may be said under none." Nor have Bultmann and the supporters of his kind of demythologisation been conspicuously helpful in this regard: their failure to be so is one of the weakest parts of their whole position. At worst, their *regula fidei* is the *kerygma* minus what conflicts with the *Weltanschauung* of "modern man;" at best, it is that within the *kerygma* which is patient of existentialist interpretation. In either case dogmatics is subjected to a heteronomy, that is, to the definition of specific content by considerations extraneous to itself.

It might be thought at this stage that such embarrassment affects only the New Testament demythologisers. But not so. If it is held, as suggested above, that some form of demythologisation is the perennial task of theology, then the problem exists also for the specialist in dogmatics. If, in fact, theology is constantly endeavouring to construe the original *kerygma* in systematic terms which are drawn from contemporary culture, then the absence of any clearly formulated criterion of theological truth, whereby we can determine whether any given contemporary term is valid, is *prima facie* at least, a very serious disability. When has the contemporary concept ceased to be the servant and become the master? This is the question which theology must never cease to ask itself. It may be that in the end of the day we shall discover that we can not have such a criterion; and further, that we ought not to have one, for if we did, we should have the Word of God in our pocket, a kind of foot-rule with which to measure propositions. To ask for a criterion of truth in theology could be an impatient demand to walk by sight, when the Gospel exacts of us that we walk by faith—even in theology. However, if that is to be the final answer, it ought to come after much more searching for a criterion than we have done since the controversy on demythologisation burst upon us. So far, even the theological disputants have not extensively tackled Bultmann on this question of the criterion, of how he, and we, know what are the defined limits of the *kerygma*.

II. Analogy in Dogmatics

Granted that it is, as Barth puts it, the continual obligation of the Church to say to our generation in its language what the Apostles and Prophets said to their generation in theirs: granted that it is the specific obligation of dogmatics to keep vigilance upon the adequacy of such language—and the whole demythologisation controversy has confirmed both of these provisions;

then, the place of analogy in theological statement, as well as in proclamation, requires most careful examination. For analogy is the basis of all demythologisation, as practised either by Bultmann or by dogmatic theologians. Statements a,b,c, mean for Generation A what statements x,y,z mean for Generation X: that is the pattern of demythologisation, and it is essentially the pattern of analogy. But there is nothing particularly modern in analogical statement. It is the basis of the "I am" sayings in the Fourth Gospel; it is employed by the Apostle Paul in Galatians 4, as well as by the expository preacher in any age; by Augustine and Calvin in their sermons and equally by W. Vischer in his Christological interpretation of the Old Testament. Its ubiquity in the Church's thinking has not been reflected in critical analysis of her employment of it, there being scarcely one major treatment of the subject between Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth.

It is beyond our present possible scope to deal with the general problem of analogy, but the immediate purpose is served if the relevance of the demythologisation controversy reminds us of the importance of striking the right balance between what has been called the positive and the negative elements in the analogies used both in demythologisation and dogmatic formulation. When we say that there is an analogy between Situation A and Situation X, I think that we mean something such as follows: Situation A is composed of elements a,b,c,d,e,f, and Situation X of elements a,b,c,k, l,m; a,b,c constituting the positive, and d,e,f,k,l,m, constituting the negative elements. The effectiveness of the analogy depends on three things: first, and obviously, on the identity of a,b,c in the two situations; secondly, on the relation of the d,e,f, to the k,l,m; and thirdly, on the extent to which the positive elements are affected by their relation to the negative elements in the different situations. In the present controversy, the k,l,m used by Bultmann (existentialist philosophy), the critics would say, so affects the a,b,c as to produce something which is different from the a,b,c, of the *kerygma* situation; or, alternatively, the negative elements of the analogy destroy the positive. The same thing happens in a much more extreme form in the philosophy of Spinoza, when he employs the terms God, Nature and Divine Attributes in what A. E. Taylor once called the Spinozistic acosmism.

But in the hands of the demythologisers and the dogmatic theologians, analogy is not used only for purposes of statement. It carries a practical inference; in Brunner's words, it contains an imperative as well as an indicative. In fact, it is to Bultmann's credit that, despite the "coat-trailing" in which he indulges, and the fascination for him of existentialism, he is generally concerned to bring the *kerygma* home to our generation in terms both of gift and demand. The relevance of this fact to our theological thinking is that it brings us to the realisation that analogy dare never become for us simply a logical problem and that it must have as its end-term the salvation of men and women. In a single word, this is the difference between Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the subject and Karl Barth's.

III. Hypostatic Union and Theological Language

It seems to be that the demythologiser is committed to some form of distinction between the essential content of the Christian Faith and the transient forms which that content may take in different generations. In discussing the bearing of this distinction upon the question of the criterion of theological truth, we were examining the *practicability* of this distinction. The issue which I would like to raise now is that of the *desirability* of this distinction; and the issue relates to the seriousness with which we are prepared to allow our theological statement to be affected by our Christology. Professor T. F. Torrance in the Albrecht Stumpff Memorial Lecture of 1954 (printed in The Scottish Journal of Theology, Volume 7, pp. 245ff.) has shown how the Chalcedonian Christology of the hypostatic union is to be worked out in soteriology and the doctrine of the Church. But surely, too, there ought to be some answer to the demythologisation question in terms of that Christology and of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

The answer might be along such lines as these. If it is true, as Leo's Tome says, that in Jesus Christ the two natures co-exist, *indivise et inseparabiliter*, then two clear consequences follow. First, it is not surprising that in the language in which we seek to speak of Him, we find difficulty in dividing and separating the human from the divine, and that we are unable to grasp the divine as an entity by itself to be expressed at will in a variety of cultural media. Secondly, it is open to the gravest doubts whether it is desirable to aim at such a division and separation, even if it were possible. Confessing two natures in the unity of one Person, and knowing the divine nature and attributes only in their hypostatic union with the human nature and attributes, can we honestly expect that the truth concerning that same Christ will not exhibit something of the same mystery as His Person—whether the truth be stated in the *kerygma*, in myth, in a Creed, or in modern Christology? In other words, any demythologisation which goes on the assumption that the divine can be separated from the human in the *kerygma* or in our re-statements of it for our generation, is committed to a denial of the Incarnation. It fails to see that Incarnation which happens in its primary form in Jesus Christ must happen in a secondary and derivative way in our proclamation of Him and in our language about Him. The true goal of the Church is, therefore, not *de*mythologisation but *adequate* mythologisation. Her prayer should ever be that the Word, which was once so mightily incarnate to the salvation of men, may in secondary fashion be incarnate again in her words concerning Him, even redeeming them from their sinful associations, debased meanings, and their open-ness to misunderstanding. If in its human-ness it is crucified at the hands of logical positivism and analysis, then that is the price of Incarnation—and relevance; yet, as Luther wrote, "God's Word shall have its course."

IV. History and the Faith

The final issue raised by the demythologisation controversy, which I wish at present to mention, is that of whether more should not have been done in regard to relating the central events of the Faith to history than is indicated by saying that the events are "grounded" in history, or that Christianity is essentially an historical religion. It is now clear that many contemporary Protestant theologians would be unsympathetic towards Bultmann's attempt to "de-historicise" the central facts of the Faith and to interpret them solely *geschichtlich* or *eschatologisch*. But I do feel that something more creative is required in the situation than the rather negative judgment that the *historisch* and the *mythologisch* can not be assigned the secondary role which Bultmann desires for them. If Bultmann is wrong, what is the correct account of the relation of the *eschatologisch* to the other two?

It is at this point that it becomes unprofitable to continue the controversy in German terms, for beyond this point it lapses into just another rather interesting escapade in philology. To become more fully aware of the problem raised for us by Bultmann's threefold classification, we have to ask what is the relation, to the basic historical data provided by Scripture, of the interpretations we put upon them, when we give expositions for our contemporaries and formulate Christian doctrines? Back of that question, there is another: what is the relation to the empirical data observable by our Lord's contemporaries, believers and unbelievers, of the interpretations which the believers put upon the data? We may sum up both questions by asking: how are data, interpretation and fact inter-related?

One view is to say that the data are facts, that the interpretations we put upon them belong to a different order and that, while every one agrees about the facts, our interpretations are of varying degrees of validity. In this way, the Scriptural evidence for our Lord's life, for example, is the factual basis upon which we may erect the Orthodox conception of Christ, the Liberal or even the Humanist one. The factual data, so some of the older Liberals would have said, are patient of any one of these three interpretations, though they usually secured a higher validity for their own by tampering with the Scriptural data. As soon as they did so, they had moved away from the first view of the relation of data, interpretation and fact. The other view is to say, with Professor N. Kemp Smith, that fact is not something *from* which but *to* which interpretation proceeds; fact is reached at the end of a process of interpretation of data. To develop this view, part at least of what we mean by the "given-ness of Revelation" is that in regard to Revelation believers are not only observers of empirical data (which are at the same time open to unbelievers) but are also provided with the interpretation, which enables them to apprehend, and be apprehended of, certain *facts*. Revelation is not therefore, reached by means of processes of inference from, and private interpretations of, certain objective uninter-

preted data; it is a situation in which the data, as defined above, are presented to him in interpreted form and as fact. What the unbeliever observes, what could be called the *historisch* in Bultmann's language is an abstract from what is for the Christian a living situation; it is analytically posterior to it and not prior. Bultmann looks on Revelation as a body of data to be manipulated to suit a philosophy, whereas indeed it is a set of facts, an ultimate reality, with which all philosophy and philosophers must come to terms, and by which they will be finally judged.

Such, then, is the final challenge put to dogmatic theology by the demythologisation controversy: are we sufficiently sure ourselves of the "givenness of Revelation," of its factuality over against the theoretical quality which some of its expositors would assign to it, to be able to defend it in face of all attempts to reduce it to something less than itself?

Soviet Materialistic Philosophy versus American Practical Materialism*

W. O. FENNELL

IN the development of this subject an attempt will be made to show that in the ideologies and practices of the two great powers mentioned in the title there are inconsistencies which, for all the differences in thought and life between the two, make for the fact that they have much in common. Communist philosophy, being as the title suggests a materialistic philosophy, is in theory opposed to an idealistic humanism which gives a certain primacy to spirit, freedom, morality, the dignity and worth of the individual person. Yet in practice Communists contradict the logic of their materialism by an implicit "humanism" in that they pass moral judgments on party members and opponents alike, as if men were after all self-determining beings, morally responsible for their decisions and actions. In America, on the other hand, if there is a commonly professed "philosophy of life" it can be said to be a kind of "idealistic humanism" with the characteristics mentioned above. Yet in practice Americans contradict the logic of their humanism by an explict "materialism" which finds expression in their actual outlook on life and in their actual deeds.

We turn first of all to a brief analysis of classical Communist Philosophical Materialism as found in the writings of Marx and Engels. These men, in opposition to the prevailing philosophical idealism of Hegel, purport to give a purely scientific view of man and history. Their method they hold to be the empirical, inductive method of science which begins with the observation of fact as a foundation for any theory which is to be built upon it. They observe what men do, and have done, in order to induce therefrom their understanding of man's nature and destiny. As Marx and Engels have written:

> In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here the ascent is made from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not start from what men say, imagine, conceive, in order thence and thereby to reach corporeal men; we start from real, active men, and from their life process also show the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of the life process.[1]

Implicit within the quotation is the presupposition and prejudice of all forms of scientism:[2] the primacy of matter over spirit. For Marx and En-

*This article is substantially the same as a paper read by the author to a meeting of the Workers' Educational Association in Toronto in February, 1955. The subject was one of a number assigned in a series entitled "The Cold War and History."

1. Marx and Engels: *German Ideology*, quoted in *A Handbook of Marxism*, edited by Emile Burns, p. 212.

2. "Scientism" is a term used to describe claims that are made on behalf of the scientific method as being the only valid method for acquiring knowledge of the real.

gels, matter is the supreme reality, matter in motion, matter in process. "Spirit" is a by-product of matter. As far as the nature of man is concerned this "materialism" takes the form of the assertion that man's economic existence is his primary concern and determines every aspect of his thought and life. These men do not maintain that man lives by bread alone. Indeed Marx explicitly denounces a crass materialism which denies the existence of spiritual activity and spiritual creation. Man's cultural life which is produced by the creative activity of spirit is "real" life. But Marx does maintain that all of man's spiritual activity is a by-product of a materialistic concern for economic well-being and will reflect that concern. Man's beliefs, thoughts, sentiments—his ideals, morals, arts, science and religion—are the reflection of the particular class, i.e. the economic group, to which one belongs. The various economic groupings are determined by the kind and the degree of the possession, or dispossession, of property:

> Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and characteristically formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations. The single individual who derives them through tradition and education may imagine they form the real motives and starting point of his action.[3]

Man is therefore, from this point of view, an economically determined being; or to say that he is a socially determined being is to say the same thing. There is nothing absolute or eternal about our religious beliefs or moral values. Each class in society has its own special morality. "Men," writes Engels, "consciously or unconsciously, derive their moral ideals in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based—from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange."[4] Religious beliefs come into being in relation to economic realities. They serve the purpose of making the dispossessed content with their lot on earth, while they hope for reward or fulfilment in an eternal realm beyond time; or they are used by the dispossessors to give an aura of sanctity and of necessity to an economic order in which they profit greatly at the expense of their fellowmen. Religion is, therefore, either an opiate of the people or a tool in the hands of the unscrupulous.

We may conclude from the foregoing that the individual person is thought to have no independence in relation to the economic group to which he belongs. Indeed, on these premisses, there can be no such reality as an individual, personal being, i.e. one who is free, self-determining, individually responsible for his beliefs and deeds. There can only be individual members of a collective whole, each of whom in his individual life reflects "ideal" principles of thought and action which have their source in ma-

3. Marx: *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,* quoted in *A Handbook of Marxism,* p. 126.
4. Engels: *Anti-Duhring,* quoted in *A Handbook of Marxism,* p. 248.

terialistic, i.e. economic, realities. This is the economic determinism inherent within Communist philosophical materialism.

In this brief survey of Soviet materialist philosophy as reflected in the writings of Marx and Engels we have sought to develop only those ideas which are relevant to the thesis of our study. It is not our intention to discuss what is valid or invalid in the points that have been raised. It is the author's considered judgment that we have here a mixture of truth and error wherein what often is so is taken for what must inevitably be so. But what we must say concerning these views in the context of our thesis is that there is nothing in this philosophical materialism which logically justifies the communist's moral censure on all those who set themselves against communist thought and practice. On such philosophical premises, those who are the opponents of communism may be pitied, opposed, overthrown, exterminated—but they cannot be morally judged and condemned! The wrath of moral condemnation evidenced in the actual judgments of the communist against his "fascist" foes, as well as the trials and punitive imprisonments of those within the party who are found guilty of deviation, stand in sharp contradiction to the philosophical understanding of man as an economically determined being. Arthur Koestler, a convert from Communism, has written of this contradiction:

> The Party denied the free will of the individual—and at the same time it exacted his willing sacrifice. It denied his capacity to choose between two alternatives—and at the same time it demanded that he should always choose the right one. It denied his power to distinguish between good and evil—and at the same time it spoke accusingly of guilt and treachery. The individual stood under the sign of economic fatality, a wheel in a clockwork which had been wound up from all eternity and could not be stopped or influenced—and the party demanded that the wheel should revolt against the clockwork and change its course. There was somewhere an error in calculation; the equation did not work out.[5]

There is here a serious contradiction between Communist theory and Communist practice. But one wonders if it is not possible to find reasons for the contradiction both in the philosophy and its classical proponents themselves.

Communist theory had its rise not only in a scientific view of man and history but also in the profoundly humane feelings and interests of its "founder." Marx's personal thoughts and desires would seem to have been genuinely humanistic. The philosophical system he propounded is not as objectively scientific as it is said to be for it reflects the ideological interests of Marx. It was in the name of human values, in prophetic protest against the nineteenth century capitalist system, which tended to treat the vast majority of men as mere means to the end of production, and thus depersonalized vast areas of human life, that Marx launched his philosophy in the world. He cries out against the Christian teachings not in wilful

5. In his novel *Darkness at Noon*, and quoted in Koestler's autobiographical work *The Invisible Writing* p. 356.

blasphemy but, no matter how mistakenly, with genuine concern for his fellow-men:

> The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, submission, humility, in a word, all the qualities of the "canaille"; and the proletariat . . . needs courage, self-confidence, pride, a sense of personal dignity and independence, even more than it needs daily bread. The social principles of Christianity are lickspittle, whereas the proletariat is revolutionary. So much for the social principles of Christianity.[6]

Marx and Engels both revolted against an idealism which they believed to be more concerned with idealizing the real than with changing it. They revolted against a pious spirituality which manifested an unconcern for man's physical life and physical needs and centered all attention on "spiritual values" and the cultivation of the "inner life." They deliberately set out to correct this false emphasis on one aspect of human existence to the denial of the other, and in doing so they fell prey to an equally extreme and false emphasis.

> "Marx and I," wrote Engels in 1890, "are perhaps responsible for the fact that our disciples have sometimes insisted more than they ought on the economic factors. We were compelled to insist on their fundamental character through opposition to our opponents who denied it, and we had neither time nor opportunity to do justice to other factors."[7]

Here is an admission of ideological taint which must qualify claims to scientific objectivity. Communist theory is, in part at least, determined by the historical situation out of which it arose. Its materialism is a "polemic materialism" set in opposition to an equally one-sided idealism and spiritualism.

In view of these humanistic and polemical elements in the origin of Communism it becomes less difficult to understand the contradictions in practice of its proponents. The moral judgments which they level against their opponents are a witness to the remnant of the original humanism whence modern communism has sprung and they continue to be a very distorted and ambiguous witness to the moral responsibility of the individual, and thus of the primacy of spirit over matter, which stand in contradiction to the materialism of Soviet ideology.

We now turn to a brief description of American practical materialism. In Communism the materialism is found in the theory, the humanism in the practice. In the American "way of life" the humanism is found in the theory and the contradictory "materialism" in the attitudes and deeds which actually determine that way of life. We have already suggested that if there is a commonly accepted "public philosophy" in America it tends to be a humanism which takes its stand against a thoroughgoing scientific naturalism, and the materialism which is inherent therein, and asserts in

6. Marx: *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechstphilosophie*, translated by J. F. Scanlan, p. 235.

7. Quoted by Denis de Rougemont in *Communism and Christians* etc.

man both the reality and primacy of spirit. It is not with this philosophy that we have mainly to do here. Its main tenets will be familiar to all our readers for we imbibed them with our primary and secondary school education. We wish rather to concentrate on the practical materialism which stands so glaringly in contradiction to the beliefs we profess.

The fact that we in Canada share this practical materialism with our neighbours to the south is indicated in our first illustration and is to be understood as pertaining throughout. A colleague of the author told of attending a short while ago the reunion of a University class which graduated some twenty-five years ago. He said that he could not help but remark that all the conversation seemed to revolve around two questions: What are you working at? How much money are you making? It might, of course, be contended that the necessity for making small talk with those whom passing years and changed circumstances had made something less than friends explains the choice of such topics of conversation. But anyone who has had dealings with students during the past quarter century and has had occasion to observe the way in which the question of the immediate, material benefit of courses determines whether or not they will be chosen, knows that the subjects of conversation at the reunion cited only witness to a predominant concern for economic well-being to the exclusion, or at least dethronement, of concerns more in keeping with a genuinely humanistic philosophy of life.

The second illustration in support of our thesis comes from a story in Time Magazine, February 26, 1955. Under the section entitled "Education" (!) there is an account of "as bold an experiment as has ever been tried in business: a full-time ten month course in liberal arts for young executives." What is the reason for this excursion into the study of the "humanities" on the part of business men? Is it in order to participate through learning in the "spiritual values" of a humane culture? Not at all! It is for purposes largely materialistic. It was because the President of a large private enterprise, which performs an extremely useful and necessary public service, found that his young executives had "neither the background nor the ability to make the sort of broad decisions that modern business demands." So the President of the Company and the President of the University got together and set up a special "Institute of Humanistic Studies for Executives" and worked out a curriculum which they hoped would serve to "educate" for the demands of modern business. The experiment is apparently "paying off."

We have chosen these illustrations because they are recent; a multitude of others lie close at hand in the press, in books, on radio and television and in the ordinary conversations of men, to show that the aim of a distressingly large number in the professional, industrial and commercial world is to be a "success" and that the measure of success is an economic one. Nor is this practical materialism we have indicated at the level of management and the professions confined to these groups alone. Labour, too, gives clear evi-

dence of the same. Among the labouring classes "getting ahead" is measured almost exclusively in economic terms. The adequate standard of living after which we all seek is judged largely in terms of its material components. Welfare is understood largely in terms of material goods. Economic prosperity is thought of as being unqualifiedly good; it is sought as an end in itself and is made an index of social health. This is not the place to evaluate this practical materialism. We shall attempt such an evaluation at the end of the article. Here we are interested merely in pointing to the fact of its existence, to establish the contention that at every level of American life today it is the quantitative, material ends of living that for so many have become the objects of ultimate concern.

Moreover, it often happens that this practical materialism is hidden, hypocritically, behind a facade of spirituality. We use our humanistic philosophy as an ideological defence for our materialistic aims and ends. "I doubt," Reinhold Niebuhr has said, "that any modern nation could produce hymns to freedom so shamelessly loaded with ideological taint as those with which the National Association of Manufacturers promises abundance and happiness to all if only we will let everyone do what he wants in regard to the control and use of his property."[8] An example of the same "ideological taint" might be found closer to home in the fact that a large industrial concern recently offered what at first appeared to be a generous gift of a civic auditorium to the people of one of our largest cities, ostensibly as its contribution toward the cultivation of the Arts; but it actually turned out to be a thoroughgoing commercial venture engaged in for apparently economic ends.

The practical materialism of this Continent has even more subtle forms of existence and manifestation than this all-absorbing quest for material gain. As a by-product of this quest we find that people tend to look on others, and themselves, in a materialistic way, placing a "commercial value" on their own and other's lives. We thus tend to lose ourselves as persons and to become mere "things." In the business world men are often thought to be merely expendable commodities, bought and sold in the open market solely in terms of their economic worth. In the political realm men are often thought of as mere units in the mass, "things" to be coerced and controlled by propaganda, effectively administered by mass forms of communication, or manipulated by a new group of people highly skilled in the technique of "social engineering." In the social world so often men are not valued for what they are in themselves but for what they are in terms of the group to which they belong. And even in the intimate realm of personal relations, such as marriage and the family, it can happen that we value one another mainly as possessions, as property is valued.

Moreover, this impersonal, objective, ofttimes commercial way that many are looked upon by others is reflected in the way in which men look

8. In an article entitled *The Sickness of American Culture* in *The Nation*, March 6, 1948.

upon themselves. Eric Fromm has given us a brilliant analysis of this fact in the chapter entitled "The Marketing Orientation" in his book *Man For Himself*:

> Since modern man experiences himself both as the seller and the commodity to be sold on the market, his self-esteem depends upon conditions beyond his control. If he is "successful" he is valuable; if he is not, he is worthless. The degree of insecurity which results from this orientation can hardly be overestimated. If one feels that one's value is not constituted primarily by the human qualities one possesses, but by one's success on a competitive market with everchanging conditions, one's self-esteem is bound to be shaky and in constant need of confirmation by others.

It is in this way that, for all the vaunted "humanism" which holds that the value of man *does* reside in the "human qualities" he possesses, American man is victimized by a practical materialism which actually values him as a commercial commodity with quantitative, saleable parts.

We have suggested in our analysis of Communism that the clue to the reasons for the Communists' practical deviation from their theoretical philosophy might be found in the latter's origins; so it may also be with the American practical deviation from its philosophy. Contemporary American humanism had its rise in the modern scientific age. It is a humanism which by and large is based upon the empirical methods and attitudes of science; thus it gives man no adequate protection against the inroads of scientific assumptions and attitudes when these are turned toward man himself. We are unable, within the scope of this paper to trace the way in which the scientism of contemporary humanism has left man exposed to the practical materialism of present day American life. A very able analysis of this may be found in Professor Derwyn Owen's book *Scientism, Man and Religion*. We must be content with pointing out here that this humanism does purport to have a "scientific base," that it could have grown and flourished only in a soil of wealth, security and prosperity, and that, paradoxically enough, it is not free from responsibility for the practical materialism of the present-day American "way of life." Communism may indeed turn out to be but "a systematic and coherent statement of many of the axioms of modern culture we hold ourselves".

This correspondence between Communism and American practical materialism is spoken of by Denis de Rougemont in a composite work entitled: Communism and Christians:

> The "anti-Marxist crusade" organized throughout the world by the panic of capitalism is well-known. The true motto of the crusade is: dividends first! but it proposes to use the spiritual as a mask. It enlists many estimable people in a cause which it depicts as a gilt-edged security. It is in fact the crusade of hypocritical materialism against generous materialism; the crusade of the fascists against their brother Stalinism, a war of religions which are not ours . . . We are offered our choice of two kinds of materialism, but Communism at least wanted to change the world.[9]

9. Op. cit., p. 258.

The quotation leads us into the final section of our paper. The title sets one kind of materialism over against the other in such a way as to suggest that one might have to choose between the two even though the choice is one between the lesser and greater of two evils. The title was originally given to the author and he has sought to develop his thesis within its limits. The subject might also suggest that by discovering similarities between the two protagonists in the present "Cold War" we might have some common ground for a reconciliation between the two. For the Christian, both of these suggestions must be forthrightly rejected. Neither type of materialism can be accepted for both are false. And mutuality in error cannot be any kind of basis for friendship or even co-existence. In Marxism the genuine humane impulses out of which its philosophy sprang, and which we have suggested might still be reflected in the bitterness of moral censure passed by communists on their foes, are corrupted by the materialism of that philosophy and the practices to which it most generally leads. In the American way of life, the practical materialism of which we have spoken casts its blight on all the humane elements of its humanistic philosophy so that it too ends in the dehumanizing of man. Let our choice therefore be neither the one nor the other. Let us reject both in the name of a philosophy, which is no philosophy but a faith and a way of life, which does full justice both to the spiritual and material aspects of human existence, and which secures both for man because it finds the source of both in God. We speak of the Christian understanding of the nature and destiny of man as grounded in the revelation of God to man in Jesus Christ.

If "materialism" means either the philosophical materialism of Communism, which regards "matter" as primary and "spirit" an epiphenomenon of matter, or the "practical materialism" of America, which makes the chief end of man, and the standard of all that is valued, the acquisition of money and the things that it will buy, there is no place in Christian thought and practice for "materialism." But if "materialism" means the recognition of the reality and goodness of the physical aspects of man's life and the assertion of the truth that these form part of the essential nature of man and thus must be affirmed in any statement of what is the good life for man, then the Christian faith justifies "materialism."

We have noted above that Marx revolted against the pietistic spiritualism which concentrated on the cultivation and salvation of the spirit to the denial of interest in the physical necessities and the material well-being of man. The Christian Church should also engage in such a revolt for, as Archbishop Temple has said, the Christian religion is one of the most "materialistic" of religions. Wherever it has been true to its foundation in revelation, the Church has never denied the essential goodness of things physical. Indeed it has affirmed it and included the whole realm of the material in God's saving work in Christ. For God is the good Creator not only of eternal spirits but of bodies and things as well; and He is the Redeemer not only of men's souls, but of their bodies as well. We who are

Christians must therefore guard against fighting a false "materialism" with an equally false "spiritualism." The God in whom we believe has revealed His will for the fulness of life for man on every level of his being. Salvation is the restoration of man's being to its essential wholeness—its essential unity of body, mind and spirit. Our Lord in the Gospel story of His saving words and deeds was concerned with both man's physical and spiritual needs. Indeed, in the last analysis, these needs are virtually inseparable.

However, though "materialism" is thus affirmed within our faith, there is in Christian thought a certain primacy of the "spirit" over the "body." For man is created and redeemed to be a self-determining being who actualizes the meaning and attains the fulfilment of his life in love; and love means a relation between persons wherein both the self and others are fulfilled in community. Wherever, in philosophy or practice, Communist or American "materialism" tends to deny the dignity and worth of personal beings made for love, or to frustrate the fulfilment of their beings through communal relations of which love is the very essence, it must be challenged and opposed by any who have heard and believed the Word of God.

The Roman Catholic Church and the State in Canada: An Historical Survey of their Relations

KENNETH H. COUSLAND

ONE of the burning issues in every period of Christian history, including our own, is that of the relationship between church and state, two bodies which have identity and yet are different. Both are rooted in the nature and needs of man and are composed of individuals, often the same individuals. Their objects and function differ to some extent, but the area of their common interest covers every realm of human activity. In early civilization the connection between them was so close that hardly any distinction can be said to have existed. But with the rise of the Christian church and the increasing complexity of society, there grew up the conception of church and state as two separate entities, each with its own place and function. The sphere of each, however, was not easy to define. The crux of the matter was the difficulty of reconciling the claims of Caesar and of God. Both were high demands upon the Christian. The question was, how were they to be adjusted when they conflicted with one another. History shows that they frequently were rival claims and that serious clashes took place when one intruded upon what the other considered its area of authority. The ensuing controversies played a large part in determining the course of religious history. Throughout the centuries every effort has been made to solve the problem; but no final answer has been found, and constant readjustments have been, and still have to be made. The subtle problem remains as to the limits of each.

The fundamental issues in the church-state relationship remain constant through the centuries, though the forms in which they appear vary in different countries and periods, depending upon the circumstances of time and place. In Canada the problem has its own characteristics resulting from the special features of its history, the main factor being the power of the Roman Catholic Church, especially in the Province of Quebec. This article will not attempt to cover the whole field but will be concerned with one aspect only, namely, that of the Roman Catholic Church in its relationship to the state.

The key to understanding the situation is found in the Roman Catholic view of the nature and authority of the church, involving as it does, control over the beliefs and practices of her members in every sphere of life, independent of civil authority. She has inherited from the early Fathers and Thomas Aquinas the theory that church and state are both of divine origin and each is supreme in its own sphere. Mutual understanding is the ideal,

but where agreement is impossible the church must prevail, because she belongs to the divine-supernatural order and is universal, eternal, unchanging, whereas the civil power belongs to the divine-natural order and is limited and changing.

This is the wider background against which the position of the Roman Catholic church in Canada is to be seen. The explanation of its strength and influence is to be found in its doctrine of the church and in the historical circumstances of its struggle for ecclesiastical control. From the beginning religion has played an important part in the history of the country. The extension of the church was one of the motives which prompted the early voyages of discovery; hence with the explorers came priests from France. The Récollets were the pioneers, but in 1625 they were superseded by the Jesuits who became a power in New France and laid the foundations of ecclesiastical control. The first government was that established by Champlain, though for a time government meant little more than control by trading corporations.

Meantime the question of Gallicanism and Ultramontanism was agitating the civil and ecclesiastical leaders in France. In that country there had grown up a concept of the autonomy of the national church within the universal Roman Catholic church—a kind of "dominion home rule"—as opposed to Ultramontanism which demanded direct papal control. The effects were felt in New France when in the colony of Port Royal in Acadia, a clash took place between the Gallican, Poutrincourt, and the Jesuits who were strongly Ultramontane. This was the prelude to a long drawn out struggle which continued throughout the French period in the main settlements on the St. Lawrence, marked by the steadily increasing power of the Jesuits. The controversy came to a head over the appointment of a bishop. The Gallican party in France claimed that the colony was part of the diocese of Rouen[1] and put forward their candidate, the Sulpician, De Queylus. The Jesuits, however, secured the election of Laval who, though not a Jesuit, was a thoroughgoing Ultramontane and worked to bring the church under the direct control of the Papal See.

In 1663 there came a change in the civil government. On the advice of Colbert, Louis XIV changed the adminstration into that of a French province. Control was centralized under a Governor and Intendant who were directly responsible to the King of France.[2] The bishop sat in the supreme council, and through the right of sharing with the governor in the appointment of councillors was in a position of advantage and therefore was still able to exercise a large influence in public affairs. Moreover, education continued to be controlled by the church and its numerous societies,[3] and tithes were imposed for the support of the clergy. Nevertheless, the administrative changes brought about a decline of clerical influence. In

1. S. M. Eastman, *Church and State in Early Canada*, Edinburgh, 1915; p. 31.
2. J. G. Bourinot, *Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada*, Toronto, 1901; p. 2.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

France Colbert was stressing the Gallican principle and in New France the real power came into the hands of the Intendant, Talon, a Gallican. His policy of holding the Jesuits in check brought about a marked decrease of ecclesiastical control. The decline continued under the administration of Frontenac who successfully asserted his prerogatives in the face of clerical opposition. Except for a brief theocratic revival in the time of Denonville the state continued to gain at the expense of the church, until during Frontenac's second term of office the state may be said to have triumphed in New France. Thus the French period closes with the state in the ascendancy.

A second stage was reached in the period of British rule. When Canada came into the possession of Great Britain in 1759, direct relationships with France and hence with the Gallican party ceased, and in the process of becoming adjusted to British policy the Church recovered its dominant position. During the years of military occupation relationships on the whole were cordial but with the introduction of English law serious trouble arose. The French Canadians were fearful of losing their privileges and even their nationality. They were almost without leadership, for many of their former leaders had returned to France. True, the emigration had been small but it included a number of those who had been influential in military and civil affairs. The only real leadership left was that of the church. The parish church had long been the centre of social, political and religious life and represented what there was of communal solidarity.[4] The priest was the recognized leader in the community, and the people themselves by character and temperament were readily subject to his control. Thus with the removal of Gallican leadership it was an easy step to the closer union of people and clergy, and in this crisis there grew up a peculiarly intimate alliance between people and priests, which was further cemented by the fact that no clergy might now come from France. The local priest with his knowledge of the people and conditions, exerted a steadily increasing influence. In fact it might be said that the priest was the actual successor of the French civil authority.

Clerical control was further increased by the passing of the Quebec Act in 1774. It may be argued with some force that this Act was guided more by political expediency than by benevolence or a desire for toleration, and that it was a bid for the loyalty and support of the French Canadians. However that may be, it was destined to have important results. It promised to the people "free exercise of the religion of the Church of Rome" and to the clergy their "accustomed dues and rights." It abolished the test oath and substituted a special oath of allegiance without any religious qualifications. It imposed the criminal law of England, but retained French civil law, which remains to this day. It dispensed with an Assembly and entrusted the government to the Governor and a legislative council. By these clauses

4. W. A. Riddell, *Rise of Ecclesiastical Control in Quebec,* N.Y., Columbia Univ. 1916; p. 63.

of the Act, the Church secured a fresh opportunity to exercise its authority, and thus a solid foundation was laid for clerical control in Quebec. The ensuing policy of the British government contributed further to strengthen it. Hopes and plans for establishing the Church of England[5] and bringing the French Canadians gradually to Protestantism were doomed to disappointment. The social and religious solidarity of the people stood in the way. Every attempt made by the British government to attain that end reacted in favour of the church and played into the hands of the clergy. Moreover, the barrier of language was effective in shutting out English ideas; and the French language in the hands of a church which permitted only what was in harmony with its teaching, became a factor in ecclesiastical control.[6]

In 1791 the Constitutional Act[7] created the two provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada and gave more extensive powers to each. Free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion was guaranteed permanently in Lower Canada. In one sense the Act marked the culmination of the processes leading to clerical ascendancy, and the church in Quebec reached the virtual supremacy it has held to the present day. The union of the provinces from 1841 to 1867 did not materially change the position of the clergy and the Act of Confederation was, in respect to the Roman Catholic Church, but a confirmation of its previously won position.

For all these reasons there has grown up an amount of ecclesiastical control in Quebec which is probably not exceeded in any other country today.[8] The Ultramontane ideal is widely held and the doctrine of the final authority of the Church is dominant. The Church controls education and marriage. It exercises censorship over literature and the theatre. Episcopal interdicts have a sanction that is often as effective as the law of the province. The organization of the parish makes for effective control.[9] The curé exerts far-reaching influence, and the bishop exercises a general but absolute jurisdiction. As a result, the clergy are in a position to influence the voting of their people. Thus, taken all in all, there is in Quebec no question of the separation of church and state or even neutrality between them. In spite of some criticism and opposition the Church's influence remains the most significant factor in the life of the province.

It is in this historical setting that one can best understand the problem as it is today. The difficulties may not seem to be as acute in Canada as in some other parts of the world, but they are far from being resolved. The question of ultimate authority remains. The line of demarcation between the authority of the government and the church is anything but clear. Matters which seem to be within the spiritual sphere involve civil interests,

5. A. Shortt, and A. C. Doughty, *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada*. Ottawa, 1907, Section 32 and 33 of Murray's Instructions.
6. W. A. Riddell, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
7. W. Houston, *Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution*, Toronto, 1891.
8. W. A. Riddell, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
9. E. M. Sait, *Clerical Control in Quebec*, Toronto, 1911; pp. 68, 69.

and vice versa, as for example, education and marriage; episcopal appointments and episcopal authority over church members; the claims for special exemptions and privileges for the clergy and those in religious orders; and the question of a Canadian ambassador to the Vatican.

The most obvious point of friction is in connection with education, an area in which both church and state are deeply concerned. Roman Catholics hold that education is a basic function of the church, in which it must be supported by the state, whereas in most of the provinces a system of public education has developed—hence the difficulties over the separate school question. Another major problem is that of the control over marriage. Both church and state claim the sovereign right to determine when two baptised persons are man and wife. In the eyes of the church marriage is a sacrament in which the state has no jurisdiction. Difficulty has arisen in the Province of Quebec over the validity of mixed marriages conducted by a non-Roman Catholic clergyman, even when all the provisions of the provincial law have been observed. In some cases these marriages have been annulled by the church courts and the civil courts have concurred in declaring them invalid. In such cases Canon Law would seem to take precedence over civil law. The church-state relationship is also involved in the question of divorce, since no divorce is granted in the province and those seeking divorce can obtain it only through a private bill passed by the federal government in Ottawa.

Again, the Ultramontane outlook of the church in Canada suggests the possibility of outside pressure being brought to bear upon the policies of the Canadian government. Adherence to a church which claims that the pope, as Vicar of Christ on earth, is its supreme and infallible head, with authority over all baptised Christians wherever they are and whatever their nationality, may involve conflict with national interest. Moreover, since the pope claims to have jurisdiction over all moral questions and to be the sole judge as to what comes into this category, non-Roman Catholics feel they have to be on guard against undue interference in matters of local concern. The pope is, in fact, in a dual position, for he is at the same time the spiritual head of the largest group of believers in Christendom and the temporal sovereign of a political state, the City of the Holy See. Small as this state is, it is nevertheless a highly centralized political-ecclesiastical organization and the nerve centre of a network of hierarchical authority. From it the Curia directs an active foreign policy on an international scale on behalf of the church. The individual Canadian Roman Catholic, therefore, is at once a citizen of Canada and the "subject" of the pope, and is told that his primary loyalty is to the policy of his church—in other words to that of the Vatican, in Rome, controlled mainly by Italians.

Further, the church teaches that the state should profess the Roman Catholic faith and positively aid her, to the exclusion of others. Thus the church, in addition to being international in scope, is also capable, under certain circumstances, of being a "state within a state," able to take action

to enforce its authority. The attitude towards the activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses and certain Baptist groups illustrates this point. It raises the larger question of the status of all other other religious bodies if and when the Roman church should become strong enough to press its exclusive claims and enlist the coercive power of the state in its support.

For all these reasons it is clear that in Canada problems do exist in the relationship between the Roman Catholic church and the state, and that the situation is fraught with potential difficulties which are never far beneath the surface and may crop up at any time. There is no simple answer. The most that can be expected is that knowledge of the factors involved and understanding of the historical background will give wisdom for dealing with each situation as it arises.

Historical and Biblical Theology: A Reply to Alan Richardson

JAMES C. S. WERNHAM

THE subject of Alan Richardson's recent article, "Historical Theology and Biblical Theology,"[1] is of importance and interest: and the contention of the author that we are "not to allow the witness of the Bible to be set aside in the interests of non-biblical assumptions" places him, in my opinion, firmly on the side of the angels. But some of his other contentions seem to me to be most peculiar indeed: and the steps of some of his argumentation are, to say the least, faltering and erratic.

In the early part of the article Dr. Richardson discusses two cases and from the discussion draws the conclusion "that there is no such thing as historical theology, if by that term is meant a reconstruction of the theology of any given period that is objectively independent of the investigator's personal point of view." I believe that this conclusion is not warranted by his discussion and also that it is false.

The first case which Dr. Richardson examines is the change of opinion in regard to the book of Ecclesiastes. Until recently, he alleges, it was commonly maintained that this book represented a distinctly Greek type of pessimism and scepticism which is at variance with the Hebraic outlook of the Bible as a whole. Now, however, it can be seen to be thoroughly biblical. If this is true, and for the sake of the argument I assume that it is true, then we are confronted by a conflict of opinion, and it is of interest to note the two different causes which may account for this conflict.

When "A" says that "X" is non-biblical and "B" says that "X" is thoroughly biblical, there are at least two possible and different reasons for the conflict. The first is this: "A" and "B" have exactly the same understanding of the meaning of "X", but a significantly different understanding of what it is to be biblical. "A" and "B" are then saying to one another: "I agree with your interpretation of what Ecclesiastes says; our dispute is not about that; it is about the application of the word '*biblical*.'" The second is this: "A" and "B" have a significantly different understanding of the meaning of "X," but exactly the same understanding of what it means to be biblical. In this situation "A" and "B" are saying to one another: "I agree with your understanding of the concept '*biblical*'; our dispute is not about that; it is over the interpretation of what Ecclesiastes says."

Now it would seem that Dr. Richardson holds that the real reason for the conflict is the first of these two. He writes: "But today in our changed climate of opinion, it is easier to see that all these critical estimates and conclusions are based on the fact that the insights of the Preacher contradict

1. *Canadian Journal of Theology*, I, pp. 157–167.

the assumptions of theological liberal optimism." This would seem to mean that the change of opinion has been occasioned by a change of opinion regarding the meaning of the term "biblical;" and, for the sake of the argument, I shall asume that that is so. But if that is so, what does it illustrate? Dr. Richardson's answer is: "the subjectivism of the so-called historical approach." I suggest that it does not illustrate that at all. It illustrates something quite different, namely, that two investigators who belong to a different theological climate of opinion may be in complete agreement regarding the interpretation of a book. And that fact—if indeed it has anything to do with the question of historical theology—would seem not to lend support to, but rather to weaken, the conclusion that there can be no reconstruction of the theology of any given period that is objectively independent of the investigator's point of view.

The second case which Dr. Richardson examines is Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament*. The assumption which he discovers underlying this work is that "by the methods of scientific historical criticism, it is possible to lay bare the successive stages by which the Catholic religion of the second and subsequent centuries was developed:" i.e., that by the methods of scientific historical criticism it is possible to reconstruct the original Christian kerygma and then to show how it became overlaid by accretions from a foreign source. This assumption, he says, is regarded by Bultmann as self-obvious and is in consequence never by him called in question. Dr. Richardson thinks that it can and ought to be called in question, and the points which he proceeds to make are intended to do just that; to show, in the words already quoted, that it is impossible by historical methods to achieve "a reconstruction of the theology of any given period that is objectively independent of the investigator's personal point of view."

It is, I think, of the first importance to notice that the point immediately made by Dr. Richardson does not call in question the assumption stated above, although clearly he thinks that it does. He alleges that Bultmann's reconstruction is subjective and uncritical, and that may be true. To say that, however, is not enough. What Dr. Richardson needs to show is that it is subjective and uncritical because the historical method is employed. If it is subjective and uncritical because the historical method is not consistently employed, then this is no argument against the historical method. It is necessary to ask then, why in Dr. Richardson's opinion the result is subjective and uncritical. The answer is explicit; "because it is based upon a few simple dogmas of the modern mind," including the dogma that miracles do not happen. That, I suggest, is decisive for the issue in question. What is here claimed is that Bultmann's reconstruction of the kerygma is guided not simply by considerations of a historical nature; but that it is, on the contrary, controlled by a determination not to admit as part of the kerygma anything that is unacceptable to Bultmann the theologian. It is governed, in other words, by a theological preoccupation, and that may

very well be a phenomenon frequently found in the work of theologically minded historians when engaged in the study of Christian origins. But this, of course, is no argument against the historical approach. It is no fault of the historical method that other interests may overwhelm it. Nor is one justified in generalising from this situation; for there is no reason to believe that the fault of Bultmann is necessarily characteristic of all historiography. There is, on the contrary, reason to suppose that it is not; for most historians who are seeking to reconstruct the thought of an age are not committed to, and their work is therefore not governed by, a legislative principle that that thought is true.

It is, however, when Dr. Richardson comes to deal with the topic of historiography in general that his most striking pronouncements are made. "All history," he says, "is somebody's history—Gibbon's or Macaulay's or Trevelyan's;" and he intends this in a sense stronger than that which would merely exclude ghost-writers. He means, in other words, not only that Gibbon and no-one else wrote Gibbon's history, but also that there is something of Gibbon in Gibbon's history, just as generally there is something of the author in every historical work. And perhaps something like this has to be admitted. But, surely, from the fact that every historian is writing his own history in the sense just given, it does not follow that every historian is writing about himself, that "all true historical writing is autobiographical or is self-portraiture." It does not follow, and it is not true; for, to take an example, even if it has to be granted that what we get in Macaulay's essay on Clive is Clive as seen through the eyes of Macaulay, it is surely Clive as seen through the eyes of Macaulay and not Macaulay as seen through the eyes of Macaulay that we get there.

The above is, however, only a part of Dr. Richardson's thesis on historiography in general. The other part is no less striking. This is the claim that "it is this personal quality of the historian's work which gives it its interest and value," "what makes it so fascinating and important." Now, while certainly it may be the case that it is this personal quality which gives to the historian's work some kind of value, surely it is not that, but something else, which gives it its value or makes it important as a work of history. Dr. Richardson does seem to think, however, that it is this which gives it value and importance as a work of history; and when we put the two parts of his thesis together, and state it in terms of a concrete example, the position which emerges from what he says is this: Macaulay's history of Clive is a good history of Clive precisely in proportion as it is really the autobiography of Macaulay. This is a somewhat bizarre contention.

It would be less than fair to conclude, however, without acknowledging that there are statements on historiography in Dr. Richardson's article quite different from the position examined above, and that these may very well be closer to the truth. I am inclined to think also that there may be a sense of the expression "historical theology" such that it would be true to

say that there is no such thing as historical theology. Only, that sense is different from Dr. Richardson's sense; and the reasons are quite different from Dr. Richardson's reasons. I am inclined to think that historical research can neither prove nor disprove the affirmation that Jesus is the Christ; and so, if historical theology is defined as involving such a claim for historical research, then I am inclined to think that it is bogus.

Book Reviews

Demythologizing and History. By FRIEDRICH GOGARTEN. Toronto: Ryerson. (London: S.C.M.), 1955. Pp. 92. $1.50.

THIS short and difficult book is an English translation by Neville Horton Smith of a volume in German published in 1953, with certain approved changes and omissions. It belongs, as the title indicates, to the literature of the Entmythologisierung controversy aroused by Rudolf Bultmann of Marburg.

Gogarten deals with the basic issues of the dispute in the light of the theological statements in *Kerygma und Mythos* I and II, and also certain broadsides produced by the official theologians and Church authorities who fear the effects of Bultmann's teaching. The clue, says Gogarten, is to be found in the interpretation of history.

Man lives in history and wonders about his future destiny. Man, moreover, did not produce himself or his history. Who did? If the answer to this question is agnostic or atheist, we find one view of history and the process. Let God the Creator be excluded; let God the overruling Providence be denied; then, man becomes the measure. Man will be thought to be responsible for his own destiny. This is what modern romanticism does. This is what a scientific historicism does. And yet it was from the Jewish-Christian tradition that men learned the true meaning of being "in history."

On the other hand, certain Christians have accepted that critical approach to the Scriptures which coheres with scientific historical study. The Churches themselves have not disowned it. For 'the Word was made flesh' means that the divine Word entered history; and so Christianity is an historical religion. But there are two points here: one is that we are bound to specific saving events in time. Once upon a time a man lived, taught, and died for our salvation. Scholarship must work to establish the precise historicity of these events. The other point is that Christians insist that God is tied up in the events. The Word came down from heaven (to speak in mythological terms). There was an inbreaking of the divine into the historical order. How can we hold these two together? How can we speak of a revelation that is inseparable from history? The official theologians, says Gogarten, simply make mere assertions. Whereas the medieval Church talked about the supernatural, the modern Church talks about the supra-historical: and there is no real illumination. Some scientific historians would like to find a refuge from sheer relativism in metaphysics. That is illegitimate, writes our author. It is equally foolish of the Church to rest content in this age with a re-hash of medieval metaphysics, where history replaces nature.

What must we do, then? We must realise that Heidegger with his existentialist philosophy offers a way out. Man ceases to be regarded as a

subject standing over against the world as an object. For man is now seen to be tied up in the historical process himself. Even if the theologians do not take this being 'in history' seriously, the philosophers do. The latter seek a fresh understanding of the essential nature of history. Man can understand himself only in this historical interpretation. It is the merit of Bultmann that he sees this. Bultmann will not wait to establish the saving facts in their factualness as historical events. Who then would be saved? Must we wait until the textual and exegetical scholars have accomplished assured results before we preach the redeeming grace of God in Christ? Of course not! The whole point about Christianity is its kerygmatic character: that is, it is a preaching about a Person who was and is an Event. It is a witness to God's act in Christ, made in such wise as to challenge me and you to a decision for God or against him. Christ died: that is factual. Christ died for me, to save me from my sins: that is kerygmatic. So in the preaching of the Word God finds me; and through faith he saves me. It is all existentialist, because I am found here and now, in my despair or my hope, in my sin and fear, as a man facing the problem of existence in this age and not in some other age.

The New Testament knows nothing, according to the view of Bultmann, of a detached, metaphysical attitude. It does not think of man in the Cartesian subject-object relation. But the New Testament must belong to its own age and must use the forms of its own cosmology. That is why its mythology is out of date. Nevertheless this does not deny its relevance. The living Word is in its testimony, and our business is to recover that Word and clothe it in the cosmological forms of today. Bultmann, says Gogarten, does not in the least deny the great acts of the divine redemption. Rather, he wants to find a Christology that will express the incarnation in properly historical terms, not in terms of Greek or modern metaphysics. And Bultmann has made choice of Heidegger's ontology as the best philosophy of history for our day.

I said that the book is difficult. For example, Gogarten says that freedom, as defined in Paul's Galatians, is freedom for the Father and from the law: it is also "freedom from that power with which the world is most powerfully enclosed within itself and with which the world holds man prisoner." What does that mean? I suspect that he has abbreviated an argument of his own in a book about *Man between God and the World*, and that we need the fuller discussion in order to understand this section of the book before us. This is not the only difficulty. Pages 78–81 are obscure to those who do not comprehend the verbal subtleties in German of Heidegger's ontology.

In spite of that, the book seems to this reviewer to be an important contribution to the demythologizing issue. I am sure that Bultmann is often misunderstood and that he really wants to serve an evangelistic purpose. The problem is just how to hold together the divine Word, the eternal

Reason, and the historical Jesus, the carpenter of Nazareth. A metaphysical Christology may safeguard the rationality of our faith, but it does little for the proclamation of the Gospel. Bultmann like Barth is aware that the Word is contemporary and challenging. If Bultmann could accept the view that Jesus himself believed he was God's unique servant and son, there would be greater hope that he would see how to state the catholic Christology in relevant, historical terms for this modern generation.

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The Protestant Spirit. By R. C. CHALMERS. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1955. Pp. 90. $1.25.

"PROTESTANTISM is the original creative principle and power in Christianity. It is a spirit, not an organization; a movement, not a religious construction. Protestantism is the soul of vital religion" (p. 1). This is the well sustained thesis of this little work.

Protestantism, claims Dr. Chalmers, has both negative and positive elements. The negative element is seen in that critical spirit which under God is willing to re-examine continually the Church's forms, utterances and practices with a view to becoming more obedient to her Living Lord. The positive element is seen in that passion to declare "the availability of God to all men through faith in Christ and by the power of the Holy Spirit" and the offering of such "saving grace through the fellowship of His Church and the unique record of God's revelation in the Bible." (p. 3) This positive proclamation, which is nothing less than an upsurge of New Testament Christianity, necessarily negates all that is foreign to it.

The Reformation in the 16th century, argues the writer, is not the beginning of Protestantism. It is rather the classic example of what happens when the Protestant spirit is at work. This work of Reformation is never ended. "The self-transcendent attitude which is part and parcel of the Protestant spirit," and which "finds its inspiration in Jesus Christ, the ground of all faith," will continually judge, challenge and reform the Church according to the Word of God spoken in Jesus Christ.

Indeed, the Church must be defined in terms of that relationship to Jesus Christ. The Church is a fellowship called into being by Jesus Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit: a fellowship at the same time with Jesus Christ and with other persons who share this trust. The organizational and institutional form of the Church is derivative from this primary fellowship. The orientation of the Church, moreover, is future as she looks to the day when Christ's redemptive work will be consummated in the Parousia. This does not mean that the Church is not interested in the here and now.

To the contrary, it gives her inspiration and direction for the prophetic ministry which must be carried on in the contemporary situation. Because Christ is Lord now and is coming again to disclose openly His Lordship the Church must work to enshrine His will in the whole of life. Faith and ethics, theology and politics must have a continuous and necessary relationship.

Human freedom, Dr. Chalmers insists, is an outcome of Protestant thinking. Real freedom, which must be distinguished from its perverse forms, licentiousness and freedom only to obey the State, comes only through becoming subject to Jesus Christ, the Lord of all life. Through Him are opened out possibilities of freedom in which there is, at the same time, purpose, direction and strength.

Similarly, the Protestant spirit has had a marked impact on the understanding of vocation. The Reformation resulted in a social revolution because, among other things, it questioned medieval distinction between sacred and secular. Every man has a ministry. Through his particular occupation he is enabled and expected to glorify God by bearing witness to his Lord, not only by what he says but also by the very way he goes about his work. An occupation then, instead of being a means of keeping body and soul together becomes an opportunity of ministering for Christ. Men with this sense of Divine calling are potent evangelists bearing the Good News into the whole of life.

In the last chapter Dr. Chalmers indicates the importance of the Protestant spirit for reminding the Church of the real motive of Evangelism. Moral uplift and defence against Communism provide certain motives for Evangelism. But the real motive is found in the positive affirmations of Protestantism. Love shares what it values. Christ is God's answer to the deadly problem of human sin. This good news must not be suppressed through inactivity. Christ being Lord, by virtue of His redemptive conflict in His Life, Death and Resurrection, ensures the successful outcome of the evangelistic venture of the Church. Evangelism in our day will be further served by the Protestant emphasis on the inseparable relation of faith and ethics and the necessity of nurturing faith within the fellowship of the Church. The whole venture will be directed and strengthened by a prophetic ministry based on the Bible and witnessed to by the Holy Spirit.

This is a meaty book. Ministers should put this book in the hands of laymen today who are asking, "What is a Protestant?" It is also a healthy antidote to much loose thinking about what happened at the Reformation. What needs to be realized today is that the Protestant spirit is a powerful factor in the on-going life of the Holy Catholic Church.

Allan L. Farris

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The Moral Decision. By Edmond Cahn. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1955. 342 pp. $5.00.

Few will quarrel with the contention of Edmond Cahn (an eminent American jurist) that we live in a time of moral confusion. More may be disposed to question his solution to this problem—to look to the corpus of American law for clear guidance in the resolution of moral issues. The Church is no longer considered authoritative in its moral pronouncements, and often shares the general confusion. In a democratic society, however, the law reflects the people's basic values; thus it may be regarded as a "rich repository of moral knowledge which is continually reworked, revised and refined" (p. 3). The avowed purpose of this book is to examine the law from this perspective with a view to providing a concrete guide for making enlightened moral decisions.

The book is thus unusual in its purpose; but its chief novelty lies in its method, which is to convert specific legal decisions into practical moral guides. Each topic in the main body of the work is introduced with a summary statement of an authentic legal case, setting forth the behaviour of real protagonists and the ultimate resolution of the problem. "The case operates as a prism," according to the author, "it reveals an entire spectrum of moral forces—personal ambitions, group standards, lusts, sufferings and ideals" (p. 4). In contrast to works of theoretical ethics, the attempt is made here to present abstract concepts through concrete experiences that could be our own.

For the theological mind, accustomed to thinking of positive law as itself looking for guidance and norms from moral principles, it is difficult initially to adjust to the author's reverse procedure of looking to the law for moral guidance. The first section of the book deals with this problem, where morals are discussed as a legal problem, and law as a moral order. Conscience, he suggests, must often operate like a court of judicial review. Procedure is based on the "moral constitution", essential elements of which are an ability to dramatise ourselves to ourselves and enter into the experiences of others; a "sense of wrong" with attendant emotional reactions; and love, or *caritas*. Love as he defines it is useful in intensifying the feeling of commitment; but he maintains that love is usually a product rather than a cause of our beneficent acts (p. 18). Elsewhere (chapter IV) he treats of love as *eros* but nowhere is *agape* love recognised as a ground of motivation or basis of moral behaviour.

In Part II, the main contribution of the book is set forth. By analysis of actual judgments based on the American Law of Rights, the author elucidates the rights of the young and the artist, the moral factors involved in defrauding the government of taxes, the implications of honesty in business competition, the effect on character of extreme peril, sexual relationships, marriage, divorce, suicide and death. The cases are of unequal value, but

many insights are fresh or at least freshly stated. For instance, he finds in the law a defence of a child's "right to be young," a right to live in "lyric immediacy and irresponsibility" (p. 74). In the case of a child injured while trespassing, adults are held to be legally and morally obligated to anticipate the temptations and dangers to which childlike curiosity may be exposed by anything under their control, including conduct and example.

The sections dealing with family, marriage and divorce contribute some penetrating observations. The law counters the peculiar temptation to selfishness that family life engenders (cf. Jesus' attitude toward exaggerated family devotion) by regarding the family as an aggregate of relations between individuals rather than as a unit. A court refusal to prohibit a married man from consorting with another woman is upheld on the moral ground that "in personal relations, the only things that are valuable enough to justify compulsion will generally be destroyed if we resort to it" (p. 86).

Anglo-American marriage in both a legal and a social sense has been too largely based on the maxims of mercantilism and Puritanism. Mercantilism—the assumption that intangible personal relationships constitute property with a measurable economic value—has led to the moral travesty of "heart balm" suits in which the law assesses the dollar value of alienated affections. Puritanism he holds responsible for the "studfarm philosophy" that procreation is the chief end of marriage, and also for the preference for the fiction of annulment to divorce. The clergy are charged with fostering this pretence that what did happen never happened, by presuming to speak for the "Sole Power who may be able to reverse the clock of time" (pp. 104–5).

His treatment of legal issues affecting marriage and divorce is peculiarly sensitive. Moral judgment within marriage should be exercised administratively, not judicially he believes. Forgiveness is indispensable, but it should be given freely without first dramatically judging the partner guilty. If divorce appears necessary because of genuine incompatibility, it should be made possible without the defendant's guilt and despite the plaintiff's guilt. This, the author acknowledges, is against ecclesiastical court tradition, but the reviewer believes that this position could be upheld on Christian grounds as well as on the assumptions of this book. "Marriage," says Mr. Cahn "should not be a legal prison for the ill-assorted nor divorce a legal weapon of revenge" (p. 120).

American law, he believes, exhibits a steady movement toward requiring acts of Good Samaritanism, that is, toward compelling men to act like good neighbours but leaving heroism to individual option. The definition of the neighbour implied here is clearly Christian—"the desert of the victim is not material; the genuineness of his plight is" (p. 196). But the caution that "we may not lend succor so indiscriminately as God does or . . . we may suffer for it" (*ibid*) falls short of the Christian conception of love's demands. His discussion of the "quandary of the Good Samaritan" is original if questionable exegetically.

In the final section, the legal conception of "due process" is upheld as a valuable guide to the *method* of moral decision, offering safeguards against allowing moral judgment to be swayed by passion or less than due regard for all the evidence. The author has a stern word for what he calls the "calculated irresponsibility" of so many pulpits which, by extravagant exhortations and insensitive judgments, have forfeited most of their audience.

The conclusion is perhaps the most disappointing from a theological viewpoint; the title, "The Cosmic Meaning of Decision," would lead one to hope for a final word more profound than a mere assertion of the predominant goodness of man and of the opportunity that awaits the living generation to create moral standards superior to those of their fathers. It is not too surprising, inasmuch as the basic assumptions of the book are humanist (we are to love our neighbours as manifestations of our own selves; p. 20). One is disappointed not to find a more satisfying philosophic basis for moral standards that are held to underlie the "common conscience." Mr. Cahn decisively rejects the identification of morals with mores which he finds epitomised in the contemporary "well-adjusted individual." But nowhere does he seriously attempt to locate an authority for positive law more ultimate than social custom, in natural law or some supernatural ground. At times the concept of natural law is implied but never explicitly reckoned with.

Yet many illuminating distinctions emerge in the course of this analysis of positive law; and although the basis for an adequate ethic is not found here, there is a wealth of insight into basic human issues which, if informed by Christian love, could well be incorporated into a Christian ethic. Christian ethics must welcome truth wherever it is found, and there is an important measure of truth here. The book, moreover, is well written, richly illustrated from literature, philosophy, religion, art as well as the moral dramas of litigated cases. On these grounds it can be commended as a valuable resource for a realistic Christian social ethic of contemporary significance.

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The Dawn of Personality. By Emile Cailliet. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955. Pp. 232. $3.00.

Professor Cailliet covers familiar ground with a freshness of manner and approach that makes this book a sheer delight to read. It would be a mistake to describe it as a philosophy of Personalism, because he rigorously avoids all formal discussion and abstract reasoning. "Let me make it clear from the outset," he states in the course of the opening chapter, "that I am not interested in theory here." Rather his method is consistently con-

crete. For a book which carries us forward to the unique value of human personality, it is altogether proper that it should be written in a personal way. We are invited to accompany the author on a search for the meaning of existence, and it is more than subtle artifice that conveys the impression of actually thinking with Professor Cailliet as we move from chapter to chapter. We are addressed as participant adventurers rather than prospective students. "This is a quest," he says, "not an argument," and a little further on he speaks of his work as "an exploration to be shared with the reader."

One is tempted almost to describe this book as "Existentialism without tears"! Certainly, as we might expect from the author's devotion to Pascal, which by no means is suppressed in this latest work, the approach is from the view-point of personal commitment and decision rather than argument and demonstration. However, there is a complete absence of the tortuous and tortured modes of thought and expression that frequently make contemporary philosophical writing such heavy going for the reader, often leaving him perplexed rather than enlightened, and distracted rather than assured. Not that Professor Cailliet is concerned to follow an easy pathway with his eye only upon pleasant and encouraging prospects and a determined purpose to neglect what is ugly, dark and challenging. He moves steadily forward from place to place rather than from point to point until he reaches the position where the human soul stands alone with God as the only satisfying interpretation of existence or as he calls it "the landscape of reality."

There is something quite engaging about a book that introduces us in the opening lines to Robinson Crusoe, cast ashore on an island and beginning to ask, "What kind of place am I in?" To this anxious, albeit enforced question, Professor Cailliet continues to bring us back throughout the course of the volume. For this is the quest of every man, the search for himself in his world. Man and his environment are mutually involved and the very fact that he is compelled to ask questions is indicative of the answer. He is a unique appearance within the scheme of being with the unique endowment and promise, which are in the nature of personality. In the last resort the answer is not the solution of a problem but a decision for or against God.

As has already been indicated, not a little of the attractiveness of Professor Cailliet's book lies in its presentation and style. Should we restrict the publication of books on philosophy to Frenchmen who write in English? What a relief from the operose Germans, who seem incapable of consuming their own smoke! This work is entirely free from jargon alike in language and thought. There is abundance of quotation, not dragged in for display, but because of the author's obvious delight in the world of letters, which he is anxious to share with his readers. There is not a single foot-note, because references are made not to cite supporting authority but to add grace and strength to the discussion. The book itself abounds in quotable

passages. For example, he describes "our institutions" as "those great patterns of social memory through which the collective soul perseveres in a wisdom unaware of itself. This wisdom we call tradition." Again he speaks of "counselling services, guidance clinics and mental hygiene programmes" as "making up a new Salvation Army." The reader is invited to share the author's "own weariness with those eager well-meaning persons whose main concern seems to be with what other people ought to do" and, presumably, to accept his preference for "a clear indicative to a multitude of imperatives."

We have only one fault to find with the book. The title is hardly accurate. Personality is hardly a dawn for Professor Cailliet; it is a revealing light by which the whole meaning of existence is transfigured. While this work lacks nothing in popularity of statement and appeal, it need not be neglected by the experienced reader, for this is not so much a simplification of the great argument as a fresh and even brilliant re-statement of the spiritual meaning of existence.

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A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology. By William Hordern. New York: Macmillan. 1955. Pp. 222. $3.50.

One of the most significant events in Canadian Church life in modern times is the rise of laymen's movements in several of the larger Protestant denominations. No longer satisfied to regard the ordained minister as a hired servant, employed by the church to do all the thinking, praying, acting for its members, laymen in no small numbers have become aware of their responsibility for Christian thought and action, particularly in relation to evangelism.

These lay movements confront the churches with the demand for special educational courses and it is within the context of this demand that the book under review has a peculiar relevance. For when one seeks for books suitable for lay-education purposes he finds little, especially in the field of theology, that has been written with the laymen especially in mind.

It is gratifying to the Journal that the writer of *A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology* is a Canadian. Dr. Hordern received his undergraduate education in Arts and Theology at the University of Saskatchewan and St. Andrew's College, Saskatoon. His graduate work was done at Union Seminary under such scholars as Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. It was there that he earned his Master's and Doctor's degrees in theology. He is at present Assistant Professor of Religion at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania.

The book, written out of the conviction that "there is a need for the

Protestant laity to do more creative thinking about theology," is concerned mainly with modern Protestant Christian thought. However, in the first two chapters the author attempts to sketch in extremely broad outline the route that has brought us to where we now are. The first chapter deals with the development of orthodoxy, defined as the "central core of Christian doctrine that has held the allegiance of most Christians despite their differences," from the early beginnings of Christian thought down to the Reformation. He then passes on to a discussion of the attack on "orthodoxy" which grew out of both the Reformation and the Renaissance and culminated in serious threats from the side of idealistic philosophy and science. Although the material presented in these two chapters is extremely scanty it does provide a helpful introduction to the present-day situation in Protestant theology. The background for the present would not be complete, however, without a treatment of the stubborn defence of orthodoxy that we associate with the term "Fundamentalism" and the attempt to accomodate Christian thought to modern ways of thinking which goes by the name of "Liberalism." The former is dealt with appreciatively, though very critically, in chapter three and the latter, with equal objectivity, in chapter four.

It is with chapter five, "The Remaking of Liberalism," that we come to a thoroughgoing discussion of contemporary Protestant theology. The author, following Paul Tillich, finds the dividing line between the modern era and that which has gone before to lie in the first World War. It was the first of a series of grim, world-shaking events which challenged the easy-going optimism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to which even Christian thought had fallen prey. The result has been a rather radical reexamination of Liberalism on the one hand and the rise of Neo-Orthodox theology on the other. The theology of the great European representatives of the latter, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, is given special consideration in chapter six, while that of Reinhold Niebuhr, the leader of American Protestant Neo-orthodoxy is given a full chapter to itself in number seven. The theology of Paul Tillich, represented as "the boundary between Liberalism and Neo-Orthodoxy," is also given special treatment in chapter eight.

We come to the author's own theological point of view in chapter nine which is discussed under the title "Orthodoxy as a Growing Tradition." Here he takes note of the contribution of such scholars as William Temple, J. S. Whale, Donald Baillie, Alan Richardson. He ventures the opinion that it is with the theological trends represented by these men that the future of Protestant theology lies. The Ecumenical Movement will perhaps prove to be the locus for its development.

Dr. Hordern has made a deliberate attempt to write a book for laymen. We cannot agree with his publishers that he has avoided the use of technical language. How could he write meaningfully of theology if he did? We would even say that at times he is carried away with his subject to such an

extent that he forgets for a time the laity for whom he is writing. But the book is certainly far easier to read than the writings of any of the theologians with whom he deals and ought to serve as a very helpful guide to an understanding of them for educated laymen—and even clergy!—who recognize with the author that theology "is . . . the attempt to change the thinking of men so that they will act as Christians" and who wish, therefore, to engage themselves in its essential and creative endeavours.

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Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis. By WILLIAM GRAHAM COLE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. Pp. 329. $4.00.

ALL who are concerned with the Christian understanding of the person, whether as preachers, counsellors or educators, will be grateful for this book. It is eminently readable, and is a capable and honest attempt to overcome the contradiction between the theological and the psychoanalytical interpretation of sex as a constituent factor in personality. The book is timely, and fills a need not at present completely met by such other writings as Leslie Weatherhead's *The Mastery of Sex* and Otto Piper's *The Christian Interpretation of Sex.*

The work of Freud and his successors drew attention to the unconscious motivational factors in personality, and in particular to the element of repressed sexuality. Freud's clinical experience, and his strong speculative bias, led him to an almost monistic interpretation of personality, which tended to regard sexuality as all-determinative and even derived religious belief from this source. Gordon Allport has rightly pointed out that the nature of the person, and of the religious sentiment, are too complex to be thus simply explained. But there remains the very important task of relating the data which have been uncovered by the psychoanalytic approach to personality and to its sexual determinant in particular, to the total view of the person as understood by the Christian faith. In the anxiety to secure a rapprochement between the theological and the psychological understanding of man, this task is sometimes incorrectly stated. David Roberts, in his *Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man,* at times creates the impression that the classical Biblical doctrines, of sin and of salvation, for example, must be revised in the light of the psychoanalytic description of human behaviour; and Cole errs in a similar direction when he says that the Christian faith must be subjected to the "corrective" of experience, (p. 293), as though the centre from which the norms of Christian truth are derived were human experience. Looseness of expression in this area of thought is dangerous. The task must be more rigorously defined. It is not a theological obligation to accommodate Biblical doctrine to scientific "fact"; but rather

to show how the progressive disclosure of scientific truth complements rather than modifies the truth contained in the Biblical revelation.

The central argument of the book is that the pristine naturalism of the Biblical understanding of sex has been overlaid by a dualism which is essentially foreign to the Biblical doctrine of creation and to Christian anthropology, deriving rather from Hellenistic sources which, through the influence of Neo-Platonism upon such writers as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, became a permanent ingredient in subsequent formulations of both Roman Catholic and Reformed theology. The implicit conviction runs through the writer's argument that the distortion imported from this alien source into the developed theological statements in regard to the body can be removed through a more frank appreciation, by the Churches, of the psychoanalytic contribution, with its realistic and objective naturalism.

This argument is plausible, and contains a substantial element of truth. But is Freudian or psychoanalytic naturalism identical with Biblical naturalism? Lack of precision in terminology at this point may induce intellectual confusion. Naturalism is defined by Cole (p. 3) as "a positive and accepting attitude toward the physical, material world." But Reinhold Niebuhr, writing as a theologian, uses the same term in a sense incompatible with Cole's usage when he refers to the "consistent naturalism" implicit in the attitude towards sex in the Kinsey report,[1] where it becomes almost synonymous with animalism, the justification of any form of sexual behaviour on the basis of the statistical frequency of its occurrence. Undoubtedly the attitude represented by the work of Dr. Kinsey has been powerfully influenced by the psychoanalytic movement in medicine. The question therefore becomes pertinent whether the argument set forth in the book under review is not based on too naïve an assumption about the possibility of a synthesis between the psychoanalytic and the Christian views of sex.

Nevertheless this work does employ a sound method of procedure. Starting from a useful exposition of the New Testament conception of sex as found in the teaching of Jesus and the writings of Paul, it proceeds to an outline of the development of the Biblical doctrine in Roman Catholic theology in two chapters devoted to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and the Council of Trent. So far as one can judge, these give a fair summary of the respective positions; the intention is to indicate the distortion of Biblical naturalism through the persistent influence of Hellenistic philosophy. The Reformed position is set forth with reference to the work of Luther and Calvin, where the reaction against a non-Biblical asceticism is noted, but where the ambivalent attitude to the body is seen to persist, in spite of the avowed dependence upon Biblical authority. Two further chapters trace developments in contemporary Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, showing continued failure, in the main, in both streams of tradition, to re-

1. Article: Sex and Religion in the Kinsey Report, in *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, Vol. IX, No. 2. January, 1954.

capture completely the authentic, non-dualistic, Christian interpretation of sex.

Alongside this is set a companion study of sex in psychoanalysis, beginning with a very readable account of the development of the thought of Freud himself, and noting some of the bifurcations within the main movement in such writers as Karen Horney, Franz Alexander and Sandor Rado. No attempt at a complete historical survey is claimed; but one is surprised at the scant attention paid to such major names as Jung, Adler, and even Havelock Ellis, reference to whose work, one would have surmised, might strengthen the argument of this book in some respects.

The least satisfactory portion of this interesting study is the concluding "Critical Reconstruction of Christian Interpretations of Sex." The urgent desideratum at the moment is not a summary restatement of the psychoanalytic point of view with respect to the sexual element in personality, valuable though this may be for the layman: but rather a critical estimate of the Freudian construction of personality, and of sex as a constituent part of it, from the perspective of Christian anthropology and the Christian attitude to the body.This the book fails to provide. The lack, however, does not negate the value of Cole's work in placing alongside each other, in very competent fashion, the two contrasted or complementary approaches to sex—naturalism "under God," and scientific naturalism. The book is, in a sense, prolegomena. It presumes a further and major task, the restatement, namely, in the immediate context of the data provided by the psychoanalytic movement, of the Christian understanding of sexuality in human nature. This would include a clear indication of those areas in which the psychoanalytic point of view is not in harmony with Biblical doctrine, as well as of the places where its contribution sheds fresh light upon Christian truth.

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